

FBIS

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PROGRAM, COMMENTARIES ON REYKJAVIK SUMMIT MEETING

'Studio 9' Program

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["Studio 9" program, presented by Professor Valentine Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio, with Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the APN Board]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades. In our previous discussion here in 'Studio 9' of the Ostankino Television Center, we agreed that the next discussion would be devoted to the results of the Reykjavik meeting. For this reason, I asked Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the APN Board, who went to the Icelandic capital as experts, to take part in our discussion today. At the meeting held in the Icelandic capital, the large-scale proposals submitted by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev have now been evaluated by the world as the most important event, an event of world significance, not only today, but having along-term influence on the course of the political process in the world arena.

In the past, few days, the Reykjavik meeting has naturally been the main topic both in the world press and in the statements of state and political leaders, and for this reason I would like to begin our discussion by asking you, Valentin Mikhaylovich, to make an assessment of these comments.

[Falin] If we began to analyze the comments, we would probably take up all the broadcasting time. Therefore, I shall be very brief. The comments can be divided into three groups. The first and the main group of comments voiced, irrespective of the social, political, and even military borders now dividing the world, are disappointing on the one hand in the fact that, in Reykjavik, despite existing objective and favorable prerequisites for achieving agreement, agreement did not occur at the last moment. The U.S. side did not find it possible in Reykjavik to give preference to important considerations, long-term interests, interests which will determine the face of the future world for decades ahead, and the security of the United States itself, over hackneyed considerations.

This disappointment is not just that of bitterness over unfulfilled hopes. No, people are making a balanced assessment. They perfectly understand, and this is felt in their comments, that Reykjavik is a huge part, you could say a whole block, of international relations, which will be the foundation for the development of positive international development for a long time to come. The disappointment is accompanied by an understanding that it was possible in Reykjavik to cover in a few days a road which took many years in the past.

The second group of comments depends on political and ideological sympathies, on allies' commitments. I am talking first of all about comments in Western Europe and some other countries close to the United States. The principle is as follows: It does not matter what the United States does, the main point is that it is precisely the United States doing it, and for this reason it is clear beforehand that the laurels will go to Washington whatever it does. They ignore the material aspects of the issue in their comments. Apparently, they are also little interested in the possibility of achievement or nonachievement of an agreement.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich, some even assert that the Soviet proposals there were almost impromptu.

[Falin] These are convenient statements, because they justify this kind of reaction, this kind of comment, this kind of assessment of what has happened.

Finally, there are comments arising from certain military considerations. For instance, Rogers made a formal protest to the U.S. Government, the U.S. Administration.

[Arbatov] On behalf of the NATO bureaucracy.

[Falin] On behalf of the NATO bureaucracy. It is also part of the military-industrial complex. It is a transnational military-industrial complex. This protest is connected with the United States allegedly almost condemning Europe to a nuclear-free existence. Nuclear-free in our view is strong security in the military-political aspect. For a certain group of this type of leader, that is a life full of worry and danger. That is a different scale of thinking, a different scale of assessment, which explains many things to us concerning the hidden trends and events in Western countries.

[Arbatov] I think this is most probably a general assessment that, during the entire Reagan administration -- and Reagan's administration has been, without doubt, a record one in the field of propaganda among all the U.S. Administrations -- a Hollywood-type propaganda machine has conducted the greatest propaganda campaign in the history of the administration, aimed precisely at convincing everyone of correctness of the United States. Here they constantly rush about, they shift daily; it has to be said they shift skillfully. At first, it was said that everything had failed, and failed through the fault of the Soviet Union. Then it was said that everything was in order. Why? Because U.S. elections were approaching.

[Zorin interrupts] Two weeks...

[Arbatov] They reasoned and decided that it would be better if it were said that everything was in order. Now an effort is being made in the very opposite direction; they pretend that everything is almost in order, that a great forward step has been made, that a little bit more pressure, and everything would be in order.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, I would like you to continue commentary in the following aspect. There are different kinds of commentaries; there are malicious ones, there are some honestly failing to understand matters. What do you think it is necessary to do, in light of the campaign of reactions, the wave of comments these days -- what do you think requires additional explanation and commentary on our positions?

[Arbatov] You see, the trouble is that much does not reach America. So, from that point of view, everything needs to be explained. We cannot do that, and it is hardly possible that many will watch our 'Studio 9' there. Everything is in doubt, beginning with how the talks began and ending with how they closed. Who submitted the proposals for instance? The Americans say that Reagan submitted them all. While we, who have been in Reykjavik, know especially well that he actually came with empty pockets, empty hands as Mikhail Sergeyevich said. How did they end?

At first, Poindexter announced that Reagan slammed the door, and then, on noting that the public did not like that, Larry Speakes corrected him, saying it was not so, that it was Gorbachev who stood up and ended the talks. If we talk about more serious matters, I would say the following. First, about the proposals. Reagan said that agreement was reached only about destroying all ballistic missiles by the year 1990. Shultz was more accurate. He said all strategic arms. More accurately, the talk was about nuclear arms. Concerning intermediate-range weapons, is it possible to remove from our package of proposals, which included three large parts -- strategic arms, intermediate-range weapons the ABM treaty and ending nuclear testing -- something suitable for the Americans. It was said all the time that was a package and not a menu from which you could select what you liked and let others eat what you could not swallow; that you have to accept it as such, as this package covers all aspects of equal security. Now speculations have begun on intermediate-range weapons; whether it is possible to pull them out. We are even criticized for linking this with star wars. I think that all understand our logic. If we agreed to far-reaching measures on intermediate-range weapons, we could not overlook what would happen with strategic arms, where we have given up counting U.S. forward-based forces and some other systems.

Then, an interesting thing has happened now which requires not so much explanation as comment. The Americans have stopped talking about verification. Yes, the Soviet Union has gone all the way here. Moreover, with Valentin Mikhaylovich, we saw something very astonishing when Marshal Akhromeyev tried to convince Perle about the need for on-the-spot inspection. Perle said: No, a simple statement is sufficient; you have to believe us.

[Falin interrupts] No, he said something more sophisticated; that in free U.S. society, arms spending is determined by Congress, and anything that interests you in the field of verification you can read in the Congressional Record. This is sufficient to be assured that the American side is observing the agreement.

[Arbatov] On the other hand, they tried to present things to us as follows, and of course to their advantage, that we had supposedly forgotten some things, that we had given up in particular or retreated from nuclear test ban provisions. That is not true.

We spoke very firmly about our desire to achieve a total ban of nuclear testing. It is another matter that, in Reykjavik during this discussion, steps were taken to prevent the first stages of the process from turning into a controversial issue for all our far-reaching proposals.

[Falin] There is a fundamental difference here, Georgiy Arkadyevich. With what did the exchange of opinions on ending tests begin? The U.S. delegation came out for an agreement which would regulate the continuation of tests.

[Arbatov interrupts] Talks on nuclear tests.

[Falin] Talks on nuclear tests. The position of the Soviet side lay in -- and this position could not be otherwise -- achieving agreement on a complete and final ban all nuclear tests. Discussion centered accordingly on how to achieve this second aim, which, as a matter of fact, corresponds with two treaties -- the 1963 treaty on banning nuclear tests in three spheres, and the 1968 treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. They stipulate the obligation of the signatories to strive for a complete ban on nuclear tests.

If the United States were to join the unilateral Soviet moratorium and simultaneously talks were to begin to conclude the corresponding agreement, then the problem for the two countries of ending tests would be practically solved. Essentially, there are no obstacles to joining the Soviet moratorium, and it should be an act of goodwill on the part of the American side.

Here, I am returning to the topic of verification. The United States currently does not want to discuss the problem of verification very much as it pertains to nuclear tests. It wants to raise the question of verification, not as it concerns adherence to the obligation to end tests, but turning the question to how reliable, to what degree is verification reliable, in adherence to limited nuclear tests, in particular the ceiling on yields. This too is a very different, a fundamentally different, postulation of the issues. At any rate, the talks in Reykjavik have thrown light on a lot of things.

[Arbatov interrupts] Now, you have recalled the extemporizing. You know there was an element of the unexpected for the Americans. Only I think it was their own fault. In this case, they could have fallen victim to their own propaganda. They said so much about opposing the policies of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, about contradictions existing inside, that they were completely unprepared for the fact that the Soviet Union would come to Reykjavik with serious and very far-reaching proposals on disarmament. Moreover, this was accompanied by speculation about the position of our military officials and their... [changes thought] Marshal Akhromeyev arrived with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and headed the group of experts conducting the talks, and so forth.

[Zorin] Mikhail Sergeyevich stressed in his television speech that this was preceded by extensive work, in which the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scientists, and specialists took part. In other words, it was preceded by extremely extensive and detailed work.

[Arbatov] Now do you understand how much they were surprised? There was this element of surprise. First of all because -- and it is my guess of course -- they became victims of their own propaganda, and secondly they did not take into consideration the fact that what we were saying was being said in all seriousness, a new political thinking, that we are trying to assess the entire situation in a new way, and so forth.

There is another thing mentioned, and it may be worth noting that, supposedly, we had set a trap for the Americans, we set a snare to catch Reagan. Of course, this is not true. If you look at our proposals closely, you can see that they are quite generous. They even include certain things taking American interests into consideration, because we know that if they do not guarantee the lawful interests and security of the other side, we shall never get an agreement, nor can we ensure our own security. This has become our traditional policy.

There is another thing. In some questions, these things were prepared as face-saving devices, so that Reagan would not have to back off, and so forth. We were, after all, ready to act quite generously here. So this too is not true. But the great number of issues requiring the need for comment attests to the intensity of the campaign launched after Reykjavik. It is an array, not only a long propaganda array, but a political one as well...

[Falin interrupts] Like the tail of Halley's Comet.

I should say that the tone of the campaign, of the elucidation for world public opinion, so to speak, of what happened in Reykjavik, is being set by President Reagan himself. In his address after returning from the Icelandic capital, the President declared that progress at the talks was a result of the fact that the United States acted from a position of strength, that this position supposedly bore fruit, and that Reykjavik was an example of this. The Russians, you see, are retreating before the firm U.S. position. I think this kind of statement from the White House boss cannot remain without comment.

[Falin] I think it is a relic of that old moss-covered thinking which caused an exacerbation of the international situation and forced politicians, serious and responsible politicians, to talk about the danger, the increasing danger of war. What does a policy from a position of strength mean? What does it mean when one state enters into talks from a position of strength? It presumes that the other state, its partner, must proceed from a position of weakness. This cannot be, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said responsibly that this would never be. We shall proceed from a position of equality at talks, and defend the principle of equality as the basis of any agreement. If there is no equality, there can be no agreement.

[Arbatov] Behind these arguments on strength, of course there were also some concrete ideas. Here too, the Americans fell victim to their propaganda to some extent. This was that, economically, the Soviet Union was in such a situation that it had no way out, and Reagan repeatedly mentioned this. They expected that we would all come out with white flags aloft, and surrender, almost within weeks.

I would like to say in connection with this that, if they were to rely on this politically then long before what they dream of happened, the United States would be ruined. The budget deficit this year, caused primarily by enormous military spending, will surpass \$200 billion...

[Zorin interrupts] The state debt of the United States is the biggest in history. Reagan has accumulated a debt greater than all previous U.S. presidents put together.

[Arbatov] Yes. Now what does this debt mean? There is not just an obligation to pay it off. The deficit is \$200 billion, but the operation of the debt, that is paying interest, amounts to \$140 billion. That means that the debt is a clear \$60 billion. Now this money is not available, and the whole matter today lies in the fact that all this talk of strength -- you put it correctly -- becomes insane relative to the new realities of the world. This is an example of old thinking which gives no key, no answer to an understanding of the present moment.

[Zorin] In connection with this, let us talk about the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) -- the U.S. space arms program -- insofar as this program served as the stumbling block in Reykjavik. Currently, many people in the West are asking -- besides this question is being asked not only by our enemies, even people who regard us quite benevolently ask it -- why the Soviet Union, after going so far, did not make the last step in Reykjavik to meet the American position and agree to the American formula?

[Falin] The topic under discussion in Reykjavik was the destruction of nuclear weapons. Practically speaking, the main parameters for movement in this direction were determined -- the destruction over a 10-year period of all strategic and nonstrategic nuclear systems of the United States and the Soviet Union.

A question arises: If you are approaching a nuclear-free world, and at this time the other side -- to words about defense against certain madmen who may make use of nuclear weapons, about the possibility that this agreement may be secretly violated -- is deploying a system of new strategic arms, then how can the first be reconciled with the second? We shall also agree to reject weapons replacing nuclear weapons, or we agree to nothing.

[Arbatov] Of course.

[Falin] In this context, in the context of deep fundamental reductions, any new military effort in a new sphere acquires a qualitative meaning.

[Arbatov] I think that the argument here was more than about SDI. The argument was about whether or not there was to be an arms race, because what is done through SDI research is actually a new round of the arms race in many fields -- antimissile, conventional, offensive and all other types. But, I think it would be interesting today to see what arguments were presented at the talks themselves in support of SDI, and after the talks.

You have already mentioned the madman. This is precisely what Comrade Gorbachev spoke about. He asked: Why, Mr. President...[changes thought] Yes, first the President spoke: After all, can't you make me a concession on this issue too? It has to be said that we were asked to make concessions all the time. Comrade Gorbachev told him: Why do you insist so much on this, Mr. President? I have the right to ask for the opposite -- well, I am paraphrasing the conversation -- ask you why do you insist? Why are you not ready to make a concession in this issue?

This forces me to think that the matter is not just about the wording: only laboratory testing and research. You are asking to across out the word laboratory. The talk is about something much greater. It started with something else: You are a Russian and cannot be trusted, you can deceive us, and preserve some nuclear arms, despite the agreement.

I think this is the most fundamental issue. If they think that we cannot be trusted, that we may conceal [arms] despite all methods of verification, that means that the President is not serious about concluding an agreement with us. That means that he is playing a game. He had to solve this issue before Reykjavik -- maybe even before Geneva: whether or not he was ready to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union.

[Zorin interrupts] There arises the question of why we must trust the United States more than it trusts us.

[Arbatov] Valentin Sergeyevich, here we just have an unbelievable accumulation of mythology, deceptions, lies, half-truths, and so forth. All that leads to the conclusion that it is not just a matter of SDI. The matter was not with SDI but in whether or not the Americans were ready to conclude an agreement. After all, they resisted -- and we were witnesses to this during the night-time meetings, the conferences of experts, where they offered opposition in actually every issue. If they were not ready it has to end somewhere. So it ended with SDI.

[Falin] I shall clarify this. It is not a matter of SDI or the declared aims of SDI. The matter is that SDI is just a name.

In point of fact it is a huge strategic program, the tip of which is shown to the public, while the main part is hidden, and hidden fairly deeply. What is SDI? It is an attempt to use new physical principles for military purposes. They say that these physical principles will be used only for defense, and Reagan says: Believe me, I shall not deceive you; they are only for defense! First of all Reagan, like everyone else, is not immortal. A new President will come and say: It does not matter what Reagan said about defense, I shall use it for offense, that is what I want. Secondly, if it turns out that this physical principle is more effective for offense than all those known so far, then of course, as happened with the nuclear bomb in 1945-46, these physical principles will overturn all military as well as political thinking. There could not be anything else.

[Arbatov interrupts] Even if you think about the shield, the shield was also often used by soldiers who went into attack with spears, as well as by the soldiers who defended themselves with it from the attackers.

[Falin] No doubt. In this sense, you can only confirm that on the one hand what is being done within the framework of so-called defensive initiatives is part of the first-strike doctrine, and for additional insurance for the United States after the delivery of the first strike. Many in the United States treat the entire SDI program in this manner. In Western Europe, naturally, we are the first to understand this. On the other hand, now, fresh in the tracks of the Reykjavik meeting, comments in the United States begin to raise the question of what was actually discussed there. If some say that in Reykjavik the sides almost came to an agreement on the elimination of all strategic nuclear arms and nuclear arms as such, and within specified terms, then the administration, for the benefit of the rightists or ultrarightists, begins to say: No, we came to an agreement only on the elimination of ballistic missiles, so consequently the cruise missiles, aircraft, and many other things are outside the agreement. With such interpretations and reading, it is now possible to expect many other interpretations and reinterpretations in the future.

Thirdly, what is SDI from the point of view of the international situation, from the point of view of the world political map? Let us suppose that theoretically the United States creates SDI. Let us suppose that the Soviet Union creates a response -- an asymmetrical answer, but nevertheless an answer to this system.

What about the other states? Neither financially, nor technically, and not even from the point of view of their areas and territories, are they in a position to defend themselves from these new types of weapons. That means that the world will be even more divided and dismembered by this force on domestic and foreign policy of every state and on international relations as a whole.

[Arbatov] If we played this game, then the apprehension some voice about the collusion of the two superpowers would be justified.

[Falin] There are such apprehensions. We know about them. Most probably, Valentin Sergeyevich witnessed this kind of talk in journalist circles in Reykjavik...

[Zorin interrupts] Yes, there was talk that generally the matter was about the creation of some kind of Soviet-American condominium, about joint possessions, particularly in Europe...

[Arbatov interrupts] I think that it was the Americans who circulated this in order to spoil the mood of the Europeans.

[Falin] To disclaim the influence of military technology today and military potential on the policy of states would be to disclaim reality. In this regard, SDI is a claim, wrapped in a technological cover, to world leadership and hegemony. In this connection, the United States is trying to challenge us to do something similar. I can repeat what has just been said, the Soviet Union has not played, and does not intend to play, such games.

[Zorin] So, as far as I have understood you, the matter is not about what Western propaganda and some Western statesmen are now trying to convince the world public opinion of, that actually the matter was just about one word, that the Soviet Union did not make a concession over this word, and that this was the reason for no agreement being reached. But the matter was about most important principles, from which the Soviet Union...

[Arbatov interrupts]...in different aspects.

[Zorin]... could not give up, in various aspects. I would like to touch on another aspect of the topic. Most of the commentators, one way or another, but generally, either admit or are forced to admit that the progress made in Reykjavik was ensured through Soviet proposals and efforts. In connection with this -- our mail already includes letters and we have even received telegrams these days on this question -- Soviet people raise the question of whether this is not dangerous, whether we are conducting matters in too gentle a manner. Do we not make too many concessions? Georgiy Arkadyevich, please answer this.

[Arbatov] First all, I think that we are conducting affairs very firmly, with all flexibility in our position; we showed that in Reykjavik. We have clearly defined the limit beyond which we cannot proceed, because that would have meant sacrificing security interests, and we did not go beyond it. At the same time, we have made any concessions. No talks or agreements can be achieved without concessions, and here we thought on a large scale, so to speak, again without threatening security interests. It has to be borne in mind that the large quantity of arms accumulated creates possibilities for great flexibility, because the matter here is not about concessions, even large ones, immediately leading to a change in the balance of power. The balance of power is fairly firm. In addition, you have to differentiate between concessions; there are concessions and concessions. We have made some concessions to the Americans. Yes, we went to meet them. At the same time, I would like to say that there was another type of concession. Well, I would call them concessions to common sense. The transition to the new position within the framework of new political thinking, when we very courageously and resolutely rejected outmoded stereotypes, dogmas, and obsolete positions...

[Zorin interrupts] Georgiy Arkadyevich, apparently this is precisely what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had in mind when he appeared on television, and I would like to quote a part of this statement: The work done before the meeting and there in Reykjavik will not be wasted, said Mikhail Sergeyevich. We ourselves have thought out many things in connection with this meeting, and reviewed many. We have now better cleared the way for development of the further struggle for peace and disarmament, freed ourselves from existing obstructions, details, small things, stereotypes which fettered new approaches in this most important sphere of our policy.

[Arbatov] Yes, and you know that this is very important, because I shall tell from my experiences, I had many discussions about Soviet foreign policy on Western and U.S. television, and in various auditoriums. Which was always the most difficult question? It turns out that the Americans and the West were always guilty in everything, and the Soviet Union had always had an ideal position in everything. And could you tell us: you now admit that certain things inside [the USSR] need review, you criticize yourselves, you are seeking innovation, and so forth. But what about foreign policy?

Now we have shown an absolutely healthy approach, identical in spirit to the entire new policy that we are pursuing, to foreign policy as well.

Comrade Gorbachev in fact promised this both to the Soviet people and the world a year ago in Paris when he addressed the parliament. He spoke about the sad characteristic of human reason to lag behind rapidly changing realities, and that in this connection we are undertaking serious work to bring our perceptions and our policy in line with new realities of the nuclear age. This promise, as we can see, was not in vain. In fact we are now proposing to the world a new policy. Colossal work has been done this year, comrades.

If we consider everything -- our proposals and their dynamism; what was said in Paris and after Geneva; the January proposals on complete liquidation of nuclear weapons by the end of the century; clarification of our position on many matters; and then the entire concept of our policy that was proposed at the 27th party congress, the new concept of security -- we are indeed talking about things that the best minds of man -- of Einstein and Niels Bohr -- dreamed about when they said that after the advent of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy everything had changed except for one thing -- human thinking.

[Falin] Since you mentioned Einstein, Georgiy Arkadyevich, I would like to cite a very interesting quotation of his: Your ability to observe a certain phenomenon depends on the theory that you are using. Theory determines precisely what you can observe. If in your inner disposition you proceed from the possibility that an agreement can be reached, then this is one situation. If, however, you proceed from the feeling that the other side cannot be trusted, that it is never right even when it is right, then agreement is excluded in advance.

[Zorin] There is one question which, honestly speaking, I wanted to ask you back in Reykjavik, but then knowing that we would meet here in Studio 9 I decided to delay it until today. I saw how both of you, after the first day of talks between Mikhail Sergeyevich and President Reagan -- it was somewhere around 1930 in the evening -- left to meet representatives of the American delegation.

You talked with them all night. In the morning when I was going to breakfast -- it was about 0630 in the morning -- I saw you returning from this meeting. Could you tell us today about what happened during these nighttime vigils?

[Arbatov, laughing] I think that Valentin Mikhaylovich and I will never forget that. It was a meeting full of drama as well as comedy -- there was quite a few episodes of that nature as well -- but primarily I would begin -- Valentin Mikhaylovich, you can add to what I say later -- by saying that first of all we saw clearly how empty-handed the American delegation was.

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

They had absolutely nothing to say.

We brought a document with us -- as a matter of fact, I have it with me, here it is -- which is entitled: Directive to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and United States on preparing an agreement in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. It says that it is a draft. Everything is here, including the date for the Washington visit. Only three dots have been typed in after the date where President Reagan and Comrade Gorbachev could sign the corresponding agreement. This is followed clearly by the categories: Strategic Arms; Intermediate-Range Missiles; On Limiting Antimissile Defense Systems; and On Banning Nuclear Tests.

Comrade Akhromeyev, who headed our group of experts, read this to the Americans. There was absolute silence. Then talk began in a remote way and always around something old, about that very naphthalene-smelling rubbish which Mikhail Sergeyevich spoke about. Then the Americans took a time out [taym-aut]. They were gone for 40 minutes. Then they returned and the whole fuss began again. Then they started passing notes back and forth. Notes from Perle, notes from Linhard, notes from someone else to poor old Nitze, who got so flustered by this time that he began reading aloud notes that were addressed to him: You should tell them this and that. Then he would stop and say: Excuse me, this is the wrong one. [laughter]

Then they took the second time out. This time they were absent for 1 hour and 40 minutes.

[Falin] As a result of the second time out an American paper appeared entitled...

[Arbatov] Directives, not to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, but to the delegations that are conducting talks in Geneva. After reading this paper Marshal Akhromeyev asked: Can you tell us briefly, is there anything new in the American position? Do you not think that it repeats what the American delegation introduced in Geneva on 18 September and to which the Soviet side has already provided a clear, precise, and concrete response? Again a pause. Then: Yes, it is a repeat of our position...

[Arabatov interrupts] A 5-minute pause. A MKHAT [Moscow Academic Art Theater] pause.

[Falin] Yes.

[Arbatov] I can hardly remember such an uncomfortable and embarrassing situation, when a question is asked, then 1 minute, 2, 3, 4, 5 minutes a person sits in silence, then squeezes out what you have said.

[Falin] Against this background, against a background of an absence of readiness on the part of one side even to consider the proposals made by the other; against a background of a certain confusion, I would say, that attested to the fact that there was no clear and precise idea as to where to lead the matter, another pause developed when both groups of experts decided to report on the situation to their leaders.

[Arbatov] It should be added that the Americans were afraid. There was another side to this.

On the one hand they could not say anything, but when they were asked: Well, we will have to report that we could not reach agreement. Then, further confusion set in. Not only because of a lack of unity -- which probably did exist -- among the group of U.S. experts, but I also think because they understood -- they were experienced people -- the new situation in which they were put by the Soviet proposals. It was hard for them to simply reject everything and present this to the President.

[Falin] They could not say no. But they did not want to say yes, or even half yes. After reporting to our leaders, and the Americans apparently to their leaders, we met once again, and it should be said that this second meeting, this second act of the nighttime drama, passed in a more constructive way, particularly as far as strategic weapons were concerned.

[Arbatov interrupts] In fact, just about only in this part.

[Falin] Yes. But when the matter came to this SDI, or more precisely to antimissile defense; and when the Soviet side showed that it cannot take part in burying the antimissile defense treaty, that it will not play up to the United States in this by any means, and that our steps can only be taken towards them within the framework of this treaty and never outside of its bounds, then it was discovered that the position of the United States included those submerged rocks that would either have to overcome at a meeting of the leaders or which would become a stumbling block for the entire meeting.

[Arbatov] You know, I wanted to add that now, in retrospect, Perle, in justifying the policy -- well, he never did like the truth very much...

[Zorin] Excuse me, Georgiy Arkadyevich. I would like to remind those who do not know that Perle is one of the most influential Pentagon officials and Weinberger's right-hand man.

[Arbatov] Yes, and he stands out as a super hawk, so to speak. Of course he always puts things mildly, he is mild-mannered. He has a sincere gaze and speaks quietly, but behind this lies an absolute readiness to torpedo any talks, as well as a desire to do so. But now he is trying to prove something else. He says that the Russians have changed their position on the antimissile defense treaty. He says that previously, before it was decided to eliminate all nuclear weapons over a 10-year period (and only the question of 5 years was under consideration, during which it was required to reduce offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent), there was no mention then that all elements of antimissile defense in space were forbidden with the exception of research and tests carried out in laboratories. He claims that talk about laboratories was raised later, after Reagan posed certain questions.

I simply want to say that this is an absolute and simple lie, a completely indecent lie, and doubly so insofar as Perle knows that it is a lie, because our proposals that Comrade Gorbachev presented to Reagan in the first hours of the talks, before they responded...

[Falin interrupts] In Russian and in English.

[Arbatov] In Russian and in English -- contain the very same wording concerning laboratory tests and research that were later used by the Americans to torpedo the talks, to sink them.

[Zorin interrupts] This shows their methods. Georgiy Arkadyevich, was the issue of conventional arms raised?

[Arbatov] The issue of conventional arms has arisen and still stands. It is very important issue. It is good that you have raised it because this issue has now acquired a very important role in the discussion. We understood this perfectly. They were mentioned in the proposals outlined by Mikhail Sergeyevich in the 15 January statement on the total elimination of nuclear arms. Of course they proceeded from the clear understanding that if we do away with all nuclear arms, it would not be for the purpose of moving the arms race into other spheres. For this reason, the issue of chemical weapons and conventional arms and armed forces was mentioned. After this, Comrade Gorbachev dealt with this issue in more detail in Berlin. After that, in summer, came the official Warsaw pact proposal on radical measures in this field.

[Falin interrupts] The so-called Budapest Initiative.

[Arbatov] The Budapest Initiative, to which we actually have not yet received a reply. All that is on the table. We understand the significance of this question.

In America now they ask Shultz -- which is an interesting thing -- How could you agree to the total elimination of nuclear arms when the Soviet Union and its allies have such a superiority in conventional arms? Here Shultz told the truth for the first time. He said that NATO conventional forces are sufficiently strong to deal with this threat. This aroused a storm of indignation in Europe and everywhere else. Well, the man made a slip and told the truth.

For our part, we do not close the issue on that. I understand our position otherwise, we insist on it. There is now a struggle around this issue, to finally find a forum where we can discuss it. What is very interesting is that it is precisely NATO that is against this. You know recently, not long before Reykjavik, I visited Denmark and had a conversation with the Danish foreign minister. He told me: You know, in Stockholm we made many concessions to you -- I do not know what they gave us: I thought they were mutual concessions which finally led to a good agreement -- well, we have given you much and now you are in our debt. So in Vienna we shall raise the question of further discussions, not of the issues of disarmament -- their conventional forces, which they shout about most of all -- but only about the third basket, about human rights.

So you see, all the ambiguity of the position lies in this: When they do not want in agreement, they shout: It is not possible to come to agreement because of the existence of conventional arms. We offer: Let us talk about conventional arms. No, we do not want to talk about conventional arms. What is being done at the talks in Vienna is even worse naphthalene-smelling rubbish, because the talks have been going on there for 13 years. There are agreements on the table which they will not sign, and what is being discussed, comrades? The discussion is about the reduction of armed forces which amount to less than 1 percent of the arms and armed forces of the two blocs located in Central Europe. If we proceed at this pace we shall finally finish these talks by the year 3000 and not the year 2000.

[Falin interrupts] There is one clarification on the Vienna talks concerning Central Europe: The Western side does not want to talk even about a 1 percent reduction in arms. It wants to talk only about a 1 percent reduction in personnel.

[Zorin] I would still like -- our time is coming to a close -- to ask you a question which one way or another we have dealt with. I would like to return to it again. Valentin Mikhaylovich, what finally prevented the conclusion of an agreement in Reykjavik?

[Falin] I would put it as follows: It was prevented first of all by the principled philosophy, if you wish, principled approaches and the differences that exist between the approaches of the two sides. What did the Soviet Union come out with? With a proposal to solve security problems with the understanding that today this problem is first of all a political one; that security in our age must be universal, and only mutual as far as the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned. We are ready for mutual security. What more can one side offer to the other than mutual security, a security recognizing that everything happening on one side concerns the other?

Unfortunately, the U.S. side came to these talks from the position of strength that President Reagan spoke about after Reykjavik. That remains the operating policy of the United States. That is the stone that upsets everything.

[Arbatov] I think that it was not just a confrontation of two types of thinking. I think it was two types of thinking reflecting the realities of two centuries -- the 19th and the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st.

One of them, the 19th, is now finding expression in America, in that unilateralism we have talked about, which rejects all agreements. If this is what Reagan came with, then it is possible to understand why no agreement was reached -- because they do not want an agreement, they just want talks. By the way, Reagan has greatly exposed himself in this aspect, willingly or not -- it may have been the work of his speech writers -- I do not know -- but after the agreement when he said that he regards the ABM treaty, to which Mr Gorbachev constantly returned as if it were sacred scripture, I asked him once: What is there so grandiose in that treaty that forces our government to announce to the people that we will not protect them from a nuclear strike? First of all, a treaty is holy scripture, if you wish. If you do not consider the treaty as a holy scripture your honesty and your dependability as a partner in international relations is not worth a penny.

[Zorin interrupts] And normal international relations are not possible.

[Arbatov] Of course: It is a mandatory norm in international relations that you have a serious attitude toward your agreements.

[Falin interrupts] This is one of the choices -- either legality or arbitrariness.

[Arbatov] Yes, chaos. Secondly, you see it is such a lie that our government now turns out to be (in their power) as to whether or not to protect the people from a nuclear strike. Here Reagan departs from the main agreement, which creates the ground for some kind of talks. The agreement is that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war. Here he revealed himself...

[Falin interrupts] ...Fully.

[Arbatov] Fully. His dream is to find protection for himself. If he believes in that, whether it is utopia or illusion does not matter, but what kind of a platform is it for talks?

In Geneva clearly the very first thing with which an agreement began, the first agreement recorded in the communique, was the two sides recognizing that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war and come out victor. If the man has come up with a different idea -- that it may be possible to wage a nuclear war and it may be possible to come out victor -- then it is really difficult to come to an agreement.

[Zorin] In this connection, in conclusion I would like to ask the shortest, but I would say not the simplest, question: What next?

[Falin] If you will allow me. The question is made up of several elements. Of course, Reykjavik showed not only how difficult it is to reach an agreement, but also that it is nevertheless possible and necessary to conduct serious talks, that it is possible to bring the positions closer -- and there has been a real rapprochement of positions. Reykjavik has shown that it is necessary to conduct affairs with this administration, too -- that if he wishes, Reagan can talk seriously, but when he does not want to talk seriously an insurmountable obstacle arises.

[Arbatov] I think that in order to give a brief answer to the question of what next, I shall say the struggle will continue -- a struggle that has begun and is in progress -- and that it will not be possible to do anything without a struggle. Actually, I think that our leadership had no illusions when they went to Reykjavik. There was hope, and this is the reason much was done for an agreement, but there were no illusions. There was an understanding that, even if no agreement is signed, all the discussions on the subject, perceptions on the questions of security and disarmament would have been raised to a new level at Reykjavik.

[Falin interrupts] A new qualitative level.

[Arbatov] A new qualitative level. A return to the pre-Reykjavik thinking, so to speak, is no longer possible. Completely new points of reference have emerged. Reykjavik is a great success in this aspect. Of course, this success is still a half-success, and for security we need full success -- for us, and for the Americans and all in the world as well. In order to achieve a complete guarantee of security it is necessary that this struggle, which has now been elevated to a new level and will be conducted around new problems -- around the agenda that Reykjavik presented to the world -- end in a victory of reason. In this respect I think, whatever happens to Reagan -- whatever Reagan thinks -- he can think within the limits of definite frameworks given by history and the political situation and realities in the world. This is what we link and must link our hopes and beliefs with -- that our efforts to ensure a stable peace will not be in vain and there will be no doubt that in this struggle -- I cannot even say that we will win: Everyone will win. It will not be somebody's victory. Reason will win in this struggle.

[Zorin] The Soviet program announced in Reykjavik is now one of the determining factors in world politics. It exists, it operates, and it will have an effect on everything that will happen in the world. That is evident.

Well, our time on the air has elapsed and so it remains for me to thank you for taking part in this program -- of course, we shall return to these problems again -- and to thank our television viewers for their attention. And so, until we meet again, here in our Studio 9.

Ovchinnikov Commentary

PM170956 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[PRAVDA Political Observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov article: "Historic Opportunity"]

[Text] People had hoped that the Reykjavik meeting would pave the way for important agreements in the security sphere. It transpired that there was even greater potential for this than many people had believed. However, the talks ended without specific results. Now everyone can see why.

The Americans came to the Icelandic capital emptyhanded, with nothing to their name. The U.S. President was not prepared to resolve fundamental issues in a large-scale way in order to really give a fillip to fruitful talks.

Thanks to the Soviet side's bold, far-reaching proposals, the participants in the meeting were at first able to arrive at important accords on strategic arms and on medium-range missiles. However, whereas the Soviet side showed a readiness for major compromises and substantial concessions, the U.S. Administration preferred to sacrifice the accords that emerged rather than forgo the "star wars" program to even a small extent.

The Soviet Union's representatives brought to Reykjavik a package of major proposals. Had they been adopted, a new, nuclear-free era in the history of mankind would have been ushered in. There was a real chance of making a cardinal breakthrough in the world situation. It could have been a matter not of the limitation of nuclear arms, as in the SALT I and SALT II treaties and others, but of the elimination of nuclear weapons in a comparatively short time. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee proposed to the U.S. President that right there in Reykjavik they instruct the foreign ministers and other relevant departments to prepare three draft agreements that could be signed during a Soviet-American summit in Washington.

The first of these agreements would have concerned strategic weapons. The USSR proposed that strategic weapons on land, at sea [na vode], and in the air be reduced by 50 percent over the course of 5 years and subsequently be totally eliminated, in accordance with the program for a nuclear-free world announced on 15 January this year. The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that mankind expects really bold moves, not merely cosmetic measures to reassure the public.

Of course, the structure of strategic weapons that has taken shape over their history must be taken into account and honestly balanced during radical reductions. In his recent UN speech the U.S. President tried to create the impression that Soviet ground-launched ICBM's pose the greatest threat to peace. But the reasons why these missiles became the foundation of the USSR's strategic nuclear forces are common knowledge. Back in the forties and the fifties the United States surrounded the Soviet Union with a ring of military bases, whereas our country had to counter the American threat from its own territory. This peculiarity exists to this day. Whereas the Pentagon has 1,500 bases in 32 countries, our nuclear weapons (leaving aside the small number of tactical-operational missiles in the GDR and the CSSR) are on Soviet soil. Therefore to promise the USSR, say, an increased quota of strategic bombers, which are usually deployed at foreign bases, is to seek one-sided advantages.

The talk about levels and sublevels which the Americans started in Geneva and repeated in Reykjavik is designed to confuse the substance of the question and by pass the principle of equality and identical security which is necessary at every stage of the reductions. To ensure that dubious arithmetic does not take the place of serious policy, the Soviet Union supplemented its draft with a simple, clear specification: at the first stage, to halve each component of the so-called strategic offensive arms "triad" -- ground-based strategic missiles, submarine-launched strategic missiles, and strategic bombers.

The draft agreement on strategic weapons which was proposed in Reykjavik contains major concessions by the Soviet side. Let us remember that in Geneva it advocated a 50-percent reduction in the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each other's territory. That was fair. After all, the American medium-range missiles in Western Europe are strategic weapons in relation to the Soviet Union. What about the American forward-based systems? Moscow has now consented not to count either of these categories in the overall equation. Thus the path was opened to an accord on strategic weapons.

The second Soviet proposal concerns medium-range missiles. The draft agreement on this question is also notable for the novelty and boldness of its approach and for the radical nature of the measures proposed. It envisages abandoning all the interim or temporary options hitherto under discussion, and entirely eliminating both American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and ridding the continent of this category of weapons. In this connection the USSR expressed readiness to make a very big concession: entirely to set aside the question of British and French nuclear weapons. Yet these two states are allies of the United States and coordinate their military activity closely with Washington. They possess an impressive nuclear potential which is continuing to grow and improve. Nonetheless the USSR was prepared to place the British and French forces "in parentheses" so as to open up the path to an agreement.

But here it became clear that despite the old calls for a "zero option," Washington is far from consumed by the desire to remove its missiles from the West European countries. The Americans, taken by surprise by the Soviet proposal, started calling for an "interim solution" in Europe and creating additional obstacles in the guise of special concern for their allies in Asia. A fierce debate flared up, in the course of which the Soviet delegation took yet another step to meet them. It stated that given the total elimination of American and Soviet missiles in Europe, the USSR agrees to leave 100 warheads on its medium-range missiles in Asia, while the Americans would have the same number on similar missiles deployed on U.S. territory.

Prior to the Reykjavik meeting the American press was predicting that the scale of Soviet reductions in Asia would most likely be the main obstacle to an accord on medium-range missiles. Doubts were expressed as to whether the USSR would agree to any changes in the Asian part of the country. Commenting the other day on the Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik, Poindexter, national security adviser to the U.S. President, noted that for the USSR it would mean reducing its medium-range missiles in Europe by 100 percent, and in Asia by 80 percent. However, the desire to break the deadlock and seek bold, original solutions prompted the Soviet Union, on this question too, to make what was a difficult compromise for it. A breakthrough was made in yet another avenue of nuclear disarmament.

The third question which forms an integral part of the package of Soviet proposals concerned the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and the ending of nuclear tests. The Soviet approach here is as follows. [paragraph continues]

Once there is an accord on embarking on a sharp reduction in nuclear arms and on eliminating them over a 10-year period, it is necessary to have a guarantee that neither side will seek during that period to achieve military superiority or create new means capable of undermining stability and parity. It is therefore necessary to ensure reliable verification [kontroll] of the process of reductions, and also to take care that all the mechanisms, all the retarding factors, which now hamper the creation of new types of weapons and the spread of the arms race to new spheres are not only preserved, but strengthened. That is why, in its third draft, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States that the ABM Treaty's operation be strengthened by a mutual pledge by the sides not to make use of the right to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years (that is, for the period of the planned reduction and elimination of nuclear arms).

This constructive approach made it possible to find an acceptable formula on the question of nuclear explosions too. It was proposed that full-scale talks begin on the complete and final cessation of nuclear weapon tests. This was envisaged as a process in the course of which it would be possible also to examine American proposals on partial matters related to this topic, but step by step to move forward toward the elaboration of a treaty which would ban all nuclear tests forever.

Taking account of the particular adherence of the administration and of the U.S. President personally to the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the USSR did not demand the ending of work under the "star wars" program. But this was on the understanding that all the provisions of the ABM Treaty will be fully observed, that is, that research and tests will not go outside the laboratories. This was where the real conflict began between the two directions in world policy. The White House incumbent insisted to the end that the United States should have the right to test everything relating to SDI, not only in the laboratories, but also outside them, and that includes tests in space.

This was not only stubbornness. Here was the key to understanding what is really on the U.S. Administration's mind. Its profound dependence on the military-industrial complex was confirmed, as was the desire to break through to military superiority via space. To this end the American delegation even went so far as to bury the accords almost reached in Reykjavik. After all, you cannot work toward the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals on the one hand, while on the other hand giving your blessing to the testing of fundamentally new types of weapons in space. The Soviet Union could not agree to this and become an accomplice in the undermining of the ABM Treaty.

The position adopted by the Americans in Reykjavik gives rise to still more doubts about the "peaceful" nature of SDI. Simple logic suggests that if there is no sword, no shield is needed. If you have decided to eliminate nuclear weapons, why create a defense against them?

Thus although they were literally a few steps away from the adoption of decisions which could have been historic for the entire nuclear and space age, the participants in the Reykjavik meeting were unable to take those steps. The American delegation did not have the political will, boldness, and responsibility to do this. Nonetheless the Reykjavik meeting was a new stage on a complex and difficult dialogue, in the quest for mutually acceptable decisions on difficult questions. The path traveled before and during the meeting is in itself valuable experience and a considerable gain. The sides have already come a long way and almost reached agreement on a great deal. Reykjavik helped to clear the way, to get rid of the obstacles, the details, trivia, and stereotypes which were fettering new approaches to the problems of peace and disarmament.

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

A fundamentally new situation has been created. The struggle for nuclear disarmament has reached a higher level, from where it is now necessary further to step up efforts with a view to radical reductions and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to lose a historic opportunity for the radical solution of the problems of war and peace. Everything must be done to make use of that opportunity.

Pozner Commentary

LD171048 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Political observer Vladimir Pozner commentary]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The Reagan administration is seeking public understanding of its position in the capital of Iceland. Claiming some of the far-reaching compromise proposals to itself, whereas in actual fact they were made by the Soviet Union, the White House focuses on the future of arms control. While few contest the importance of the summit which has brought the two nations very close on some issues, the attention is being riveted to SDI, or star wars, as the chief stumbling block. More on this from our political observer Vladimir Pozner.

[Pozner] Thank you and hello. When General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev addressed the nation on television on Tuesday evening, he gave a detailed account of what happened at Reykjavik, described the content and form of his discussions with President Reagan, the essence of the dramatic Soviet proposals which, ironically enough, President Reagan presented as having been made by the United States when he addressed the nation on Monday evening. Commenting on that, General Secretary Gorbachev noted apparently those proposals are so attractive to Americans and the nations of the world that such a ruse too becomes a way of acting, our vanity is not wounded by that. Yet is it important that people receive a truthful picture of the way things developed at Reykjavik: And the way they developed, as we now know, was that after the two sides agreed, first, to a 50 percent across the board reduction of their offensive strategic triad -- that is, land-based strategic ballistic missiles, submarine launched missiles, and strategic bombers; and second, both Soviet and U.S., the Americans balked at a 10-year agreement that would limit SDI research and testing to laboratory confines.

Thus SDI emerged as being the single roadblock along the way to nuclear disarmament. Let us take a closer look at that: The United States Government has indicated in the past that the Strategic Defense Initiative is a tremendous bargaining chip in dealing with the Soviets. This was reiterated by the President on Monday when he said that SDI had brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. While that is absolutely not the case, let's say it is for argument's sake. We sat down. We negotiated. We proposed an historic and dramatic way of cutting back on nuclear weapons and the U.S. refused to use SDI for the purpose it was supposed to serve: bargaining.

So now the question arises: Just what is SDI's real purpose? And that question is not being raised just by or even mainly by the Soviet Union which never had any doubts in the first place. That question is being raised by average Americans, as well as by their elected representatives in Congress, many of whom feel not only disappointed by the failure to reach agreement at Reykjavik, but indeed misled; a nice word for conned. For what becomes apparent now is that all the talk about this great bargaining chip was a gigantic red herring. Most Americans would naturally support something that could be used to good effect in negotiations with the Soviets.

But would they support a new weapons system? A very iffy question to say the least. Now Congressmen are beginning to see SDI for what it really is. Now they want the details, the whats and the wheres and the whys. And that in itself makes Reykjavik a very meaningful and positive event. For it is crucially important that Americans know exactly how SDI is perceived by its backers. [passage omitted] In the absence of strategic nuclear weapons, where one side has SDI and the other does not, the former achieves a tremendous military advantage, for it can threaten the other side with impunity and strike it too. Therein, as I see it, lies the reason for a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons over a 5-year period, and completely doing away with them over a 10-year period. And that is also why he would not agree to any limits on SDI.

Zorin Commentary

LD190212 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Valentin Zorin commentary; read by announcer]

[Text] I was among the few journalists out of a total of 3,000 or so newsmen from around the world who were granted access to the Hofdi Villa, the venue of the summit. I also had the opportunity to visit the "Georg Ost" cruise liner, Mikhail Gorbachev's residence. The main impression of the summit is that the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan have put our countries' positions closer than ever before since the end of World War II. Mikhail Gorbachev said right after the talks with President Reagan that our positions had never been so close.

The 2-day summit was just one step away from solutions to problems that had seemed unsolvable not so very long ago. The Reykjavik meeting has shown that it is possible to achieve major agreements between our countries on issues that not very long ago were in a stalemate. As I watched the summit I arrived at the conclusion that the American delegation was unprepared for radical solutions to the problems of disarmament suggested by the Soviet Union. President Reagan's advisers must have thought that at the best the Soviet Union had one separate proposal to offer. It's only natural that the sweeping proposals concerning cardinal questions, announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, astounded the President and his (?associates). President Reagan claimed after the summit that the proposals discussed had been made by the American delegation. This is not so. In reality, President Reagan had arrived in Reykjavik with nothing in his hands. All the proposals were put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Soviet leader emphasized this in his speech on national television on Tuesday, the 14th.

On the whole, as I returned from Reykjavik, I told myself that I was far more optimistic after the summit than before it. I am convinced that the far-reaching Soviet initiatives aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and banning weapons from space are going to meet with growing support the world over, including the United States. Of course, it will take time to analyze thoroughly the Soviet proposals and see the opportunities that have been opened up. However, it's already clear that these are not time-serving proposals. They are long-term and remain in effect after Reykjavik. Mikhail Gorbachev has pointed out that now we have a (?positively) new situation. Nobody will be able to act in the old way. The meeting was useful. It has prepared a likely step towards a real turn for the better. For this to become a reality the United States must abandon the illusions it has and take a realistic position.

PRAVDA NOTES PRAGUE CONFERENCE OPENING

PM161055 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Conference Opens"]

[Text] Prague, 14 Oct -- An international conference of representatives of socialist, capitalist, and developing countries' communist and workers party central committee scientific research institutions and of a number of Marxist research centers opened here today. It is being attended by a group of Soviet scholars headed by Academician A.G. Yegorov, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU Central Committee.

The purpose of the conference is to exchange information on the activity of party theoretical institutions and multilateral working groups and to coordinate cooperation in the course of implementing the decisions of the fraternal parties' congresses. The conference participants will also discuss topical questions pertaining to the development of socialism at the present stage.

BLOC TRADE UNION OFFICIALS MEET IN MONGOLIA

PM171310 Moscow TRUD in Russian 16 Oct 86 p 3

[TASS report: "For the Sake of the Future"]

[Excerpt] Ulaan Baatar, 15 Oct -- A conference of secretaries and section chiefs of trade union centers from Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, the DPRK, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia has opened here.

Its participants are discussing questions concerning trade unions' educational and mass cultural work among working people in the light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the congresses of the other socialist countries' communist and workers parties. Tasks to improve this cooperation and enhance the trade unions' contribution to further strengthening the fraternal peoples' friendship and labor collectives' business links, implementing the Comprehensive Program for CEMA Countries' Scientific and Technical Progress Through the Year 2000, and implementing measures linked with the Great October's 70th anniversary are being discussed. [passage omitted]

BLOC TU JOURNAL CHIEFS CONFER IN MOSCOW

PM171209 Moscow TRUD in Russian 16 Oct 86 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Conference of Chief Editors"]

[Text] A conference of chief editors of socialist countries' trade union journals from Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR was held in Moscow 14-15 October. Senior AUCCTU officials took part in its work.

The conference participants discussed the tasks of trade union journals in explaining the activity of socialist countries' trade union organizations in fulfilling party congress directives, and also ways to further develop and strengthen cooperation among socialist countries' trade union journals.

CEMA OFFICIAL ON RESTRUCTURING WORLD ECONOMICS

LD162154 Moscow TASS in English 2144 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 16 TASS -- TASS Correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reports:

The member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance have called for increasing the role and prestige of the United Nations with a view to strengthening peace and international cooperation and broadening international economic, scientific, technological and social cooperation. The proposal on the establishment of an all-embracing system of international peace and security, including international economic security, tabled by a group of socialist countries at the current session of the U.N. General Assembly, is intended to bring about progress to a better, more secure world for all states and peoples without exception, Ion Retoi, the head of the CMEA delegation and deputy secretary of the CMEA, said in his address in the Second (economic and financial) Committee of the U.N. General Assembly today.

The CMEA member countries stand for the restructuring of the entire system of international economic relations on a fair and democratic basis, for the establishing of a new international economic order and for the provision of adequate conditions to ensure equal economic security for all the states. The activities of the United Nations also are to contribute to the accomplishment of that goal.

Economic and social development programmes based on the acceleration of scientific and technological progress are being consistently fulfilled in the CMEA countries today through the mobilisation of their domestic efforts and mutual cooperation, he said. In this way the CMEA is making a real contribution to the improvement of international economic relations. The member countries of the council are consistently and perseveringly continuing to promote cooperation with developing states on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs. They stand for the establishment of relations of mutual benefit with the economic organisations of industrialised capitalist countries. The dialogue between the CMEA and EEC has been resumed. The establishment of official relations and the development of cooperation will help improve understanding and build trust between the member countries of the CMEA and EEC, broaden mutually beneficial trade, economic, scientific and technological contacts between them, and also improve economic relations in the world.

NEW AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM FOR CEMA

LD181942 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] Leningrad, 18 Oct (TASS) -- A unified air traffic control system based on automated complexes is to be introduced at airports in CMEA member countries. The plans for such a system were discussed at a conference of the CMEA standing commission on cooperation in the field of radio engineering and the electronics industry. This representative meeting of specialists from Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR ended today in Leningrad. The protocol signed maps out a program for the improvement of radio engineering equipment and of automated systems for controlling air traffic and all-weather landing.

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U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A F F A I R S
W O R L D & R E G I O N A L I S S U E S

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'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS'

LD180608 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 17 Oct 86

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" Program, presented by Vladimir Pasko, foreign policy commentator for All-Union radio; with Vitaliy Yakovlevich Chukseyev, TASS editor in chief of foreign information; Kim Gerasimov, radio commentator; Sergey Aleksandrovich Ugarov, CEMA adviser; and Sergey Pravdin, radio commentator]

[Excerpt] [Pasko] I want to start the program with an event that has only just taken place -- the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. That meeting has come to be an important event in international affairs in the struggle against the arms race, for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, and for the removal of the nuclear threat. The position of the Soviet side at it was honorable and open. It was based on the principles of equality and equal security, and took into account the interests of both countries, their allies and the peoples of all states. This position has come to be the concrete expression of a new approach and new thinking, the need for which is dictated by the realities of the nuclear and missile age. Displaying a sincere desire to reach an accord, the Soviet side, as you know, tabled a new, compromise proposal, which took full account of the U.S. side's concern, making it possible to agree on such vital issues as the reduction, and ultimately the complete elimination, of strategic offensive weapons, and the distribution of intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

However, it proved impossible to embody the agreement that had been virtually reached in accords binding on both sides. The sole reason for this was the reluctance of the American Administration to create the conditions for the realization of these accords. The whole world is discussing the results of the meeting.

[Chukseyev] [passage omitted on survey of foreign comment on U.S. stance at the talks] This unfavorable response obliged the American Administration to launch a propaganda counteroffensive urgently, so as to make some attempt to calm world opinion. According to U.S. journalists, White House representatives dispersed throughout Washington, giving interviews to various news programs, holding press conferences, speaking on international television and paying personal visits to congressmen. The President intends to send his emissaries to a number of European and Asian states, while Secretary of State Shultz has already flown to Brussels, where he addressed representatives of the NATO countries. An attempt is being made to depict the situation as though the administration were still attached to the cause of disarmament.

However, these peace-making words do not match up with the deeds. On 16 October, the latest test of a nuclear weapon, codenamed "Belmont" was conducted in sector 20 of the Nevada test range. During these tests, components of the weapons in the star wars program are tried out.

Nevertheless, when assessing the summit meeting, observers in various countries note that it was useful and necessary. It was a step in a complicated and hard dialogue in search of difficult solutions. What is needed now is decisive and responsible action by all states -- large and small, irrespective of their social system -- so as to put an end to the arms race on earth and prevent its extension into space.

The world press is now widely quoting the words of Comrade Gorbachev about the fact that the preparations for Reykjavik helped us to formulate a new platform -- a new, bold platform that increases the chances of eventual success. It accords with the interests of our people and, at the same time, this platform is in accord with the interests of all other states and is worthy of trust.

[Pasko] Thank you, Vitaliy Yakovlevich. [passage omitted: Pasko outlines the history of the nuclear-free zone movement, concluding with the declaration made at the recent Perugia conference of nuclear-free zones]

Vasiliy Ivanovich Oleynik from the town of Lebedin in Sumy Oblast asks us to talk about the Arab Republic of Egypt and its relations with other Arab countries, our country and, also, with the United States. Yuriy Nikolayevich Kasolapov from the town of Belaya Tserkov in Kiev Oblast is interested in the internal situation in Egypt. I shall ask my colleague, commentator Kim Gerasimov, to answer our listeners.

[Gerasimov] I think that the listeners' interest in Egypt is understandable, and certainly not just because it is one of the biggest countries in the Near East, with population of 52 million. For almost 2 decades the USSR and Egypt maintained close friendship with each other. Our country helped the Egyptians to build in addition to the Pyramids, a second wonder on the Nile, the Aswan High Dam, which delivered Egypt from its annual, destructive flooding and during 1983-85 saved the country from the terrible drought that afflicted half the continent. You will recall, comrades, that our country helped the Egyptians to survive the struggle against Israeli aggression. But you also remember, of course, that after the death of President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, who considered cooperation with the socialist countries to be in Egypt's fundamental interests, Soviet-Egyptian relations entered a period of deep slump under his successor, Anwar al-Sadat. In domestic policy Egypt adopted the line of restoring capitalism. In foreign policy the country moved closer to the United States, which, in spite of stormy protests from Arab countries, led to the signing in 1979 of a separate peace agreement with Israel. All this led, in turn, to an exacerbation of domestic political contradictions in Egypt. Al-Sadat's assassination in October 1981 by militants belonging to a radical Muslim grouping was a result of this.

What is the situation in Egypt now? President Husni Mubarak has, it must be admitted, taken a number of steps aimed at improving the political climate within the country and reconciling Egypt with other Arab countries. Opposition parties now have more freedom to operate within the country, altogether the Communist Party is still banned. Opposition newspapers are being published. On the international arena Cairo is doing its utmost to demonstrate its commitment to pan-Arab goals, although it has not renounced the Camp David agreements. Relations with Israel have become noticeably cooler. In spite of strong pressure from the United States, Egypt refused to take military action against Libya. Furthermore, it joined in the Arab world's condemnation of the U.S. bombing of Libyan towns. As a result some Arab states, Jordan and Djibouti for example, found it possible to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt, which Arab leaders decided to sever after the signing of the separate peace agreement with Israel. A number of other Arab countries, which are hesitant about restoring diplomatic relations, are expanding trade and economic links.

However, this does not apply to Syria and Libya, which are still strongly condemning Cairo for its agreements with Israel, for its cooperation with the United States.

It has to be pointed out that during the last 10 years Egypt has received \$18 billion from the United States for military and economic requirements. This year alone U.S. assistance to Egypt will amount to almost \$3 billion. It cannot be denied that this is a substantial sum. However, U.S. aid has not led to the setting up of profitable industries. Meanwhile, Egypt's foreign debt is already approaching \$40 billion. This year Egypt's payments on old debts will exceed income received from fresh aid. Such is the paradox of imperialist aid.

As far as Washington is concerned, Egypt's economic dependence suits it. First and foremost, it is a powerful instrument for influencing the policies of a state which has the biggest military, economic and human potential in the Arab world. It is not surprising that it is striving to continue to exacerbate Egypt's economic dependence, and this includes the granting of new loans.

One should bear in mind that Egypt is currently experiencing difficult times. Oil revenues have fallen as a result of the decline in world prices. Large numbers of Egyptian workers have begun returning from all the oil-producing countries of the Near East because of the crisis gripping those countries. The money they used to send home was one of Cairo's principal sources of hard currency. Income from tourism has fallen.

Now let us turn to Soviet-Egyptian relations. In recent years a certain normalization of those relations has taken place. Trade and economic cooperation has increased. Egypt is very interested in such links since the country has dozens of enterprises with Soviet equipment. Cultural links have also increased. The Soviet Union bases its relations with Egypt on the principles of noninterference in each other's affairs, mutual respect, independence and sovereignty. A certain evolution has also taken place in Cairo's views on the relative significance of the United States and the USSR in Near Eastern affairs. Al-Sadat used to assert that the Americans held 90 percent of the trump cards in the Near East game, as he put it. However, in a recent interview Ismat 'Abd al-Majid, the present foreign minister of Egypt, described a situation in which the Near East peace process was dependent on the United States as intolerable. At the same time 'Abd al-Majid stressed the importance role of the Soviet Union in this process.

In other words Egypt is now trying, albeit partially, to rid itself of the legacy of the past. But this legacy still exists and is still having a substantial effect on the development of this country.

Here is a letter from Comrade Frolov from the town of Mikhaylovka in Volgograd oblast. Japan is demanding that the Soviet Union returned four islands in the Kurile chain, he writes. Leaving aside the question of whether these claims are justified or not, I would like to know why precisely these islands are in dispute. Are there differences in the history and legal status of the islands making up the Kurile chain, Comrade Frolov asks.

I should mention immediately that the political forces in Japan which are raising the question of the so-called Northern Territories do not restrict their claims to the four islands you ask about. A considerable section claims the other Kurile islands and South Sakhalin as well. The Soviet Union's right to these territories is not recognized by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party either. The LDP reserves the right, therefore, to lay claim to them at some point in the future.

As far as the islands of Polonskiy and Spamberg, for which the Japanese names are Habomai and Shikotan, and the islands of Kunashir and Iturup are concerned, the Liberal Democrats claim that, geographically speaking, the first two are part of the Japanese island of Hokkaido and are therefore part of Japan. They say that because Kunashir and Iturup were under Japanese jurisdiction in the past, they should also be regarded as having been Japanese territory from time immemorial.

I will not dwell in detail on the history of this question. However, the fundamental point is this: when the Japanese appeared on the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, Russian settlers were already engaged in farming there, had schools there and were baptizing their children there. Japanese expansion into these areas began only in the middle of the last century. That was when the first talks took place between Russian and Japan over the demarcation of territorial possessions. Because of military weakness neither feudal Russia nor capitalist Russia could defend their lands here. Russia was unable to hold on to them during the war of 1905 which Japan started. Historical justice was only restored as a result of the Soviet Union's victory in World War II, which, as we know, Japan also helped to start. The document that laid the foundations for the restoration of justice was the Yalta agreement signed by the three great powers, which envisaged that South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands would be returned to the Soviet Union. The decision was subsequently confirmed by the Potsdam declaration, which set out the condition for the ending of the war with Japan, and then by the San Francisco peace treaty, in which Japan renounced all rights and claims to the Kurile Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin.

Later, however, as you know, Japan again raised the question of its right to these lands and made the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations dependent on the solution of this question. Japan is still pursuing this line now. During his visit to Moscow in May, Japanese Foreign Minister Abe said: Our most important task is to settle questions left unsettled since World War II. By "unsettled questions" he meant the so-called Northern Territories problem. The artificiality of this question is obvious. After all, it was settled in the relevant international agreements. The Soviet side has pointed this out many times. As Comrade Gorbachev noted when he received Abe in the Kremlin, we have taken a fundamental political decision to use every opportunity for the development and improvement of relations with Japan in all areas, irrespective of its ties with other countries. But these relations can, of course, only develop successfully if they are based on reciprocity, on the understanding that nobody encroaches on the results of World War II and the inviolability of borders. [Passage omitted on Ugarov comparing the relations that exist between the EEC and developing countries with those maintained by the CEMA.]

Comrade Mamedov from Ashkhabad and a number of other listeners are interested in various aspects of China's policy. Comrade Smelyanskiy, a geography teacher from Leningrad, asks us to talk about trade relations between the PRC and Poland, the GDR and other European socialist states.

According to the Chinese press, last year the PRC's trade with these countries was worth \$2.64 billion. Compared with its trade with the West, this is not much. Last year China's trade with the Common Market, for example, amounted to \$6 billion. Its trade with the United States was worth a similar amount. But with Japan, China exchanged goods worth \$16 billion. It is interesting, however, to note the rate of growth in China's trade with the socialist countries of Europe.

Last year it increased by 70 percent, while trade with the United States increased by 8 percent, with the Common market by 24 percent, and with Japan by 30 percent. These figures were published by the Chinese weekly BEIJING REVIEW.

All the signs are that China's trade and economic relations with the socialist countries of Europe will continue to increase during the current 5 year plan. The long-term trade agreements which China has signed with Romania, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and also, Yugoslavia and Albania are evidence of this. Going beyond the question asked by Comrade Smelyanskiy, I shall mention that Mongolia and China have concluded their first long-term inter-governmental agreement on trade. During their visit to Cuba this year, PRC representatives discussed trade questions.

China's trade with the Soviet Union is also increasing. Soviet-Chinese trade is based on the inter-government agreement on trade and payments during the 5-year plan. The main commodities China buys from the socialist countries are engineering products, metal, fertilizer, cement, and timber. In its turn China supplies them mainly with consumer goods and agricultural commodities.

Referring to the economic aspect of this question, the Hungarian paper NEPSZABADSAG wrote in early April that trade with the socialist countries is especially important for the Chinese side at the moment. This is because of a substantial reduction in China's currency reserves and the growing deficit in its trade with the capitalist states. The Chinese leadership is striving to obtain as many goods as possible on a clearing basis, goods for which it would have to pay capitalist firms in hard currency.

As for the political aspect of this matter, I will quote a recent pronouncement by PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. The circumstances of China and the countries of Eastern Europe are different. Their geographical situations are not identical either, he said. But we have the same objective, the development of the national economy and raising the people's standard of living. We all need a long-term, stable and peaceful environment. Although China and these countries have different views on certain questions, their interests do not clash with each other. Qian Qichen said there were good prospects for the development of ties between China and the countries of Eastern Europe, on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and mutual respect. [passage omitted: Pravdin gives a historical view of the development of the FBE; Pasko relates the origins of the U.S. base at Guantanamo in Cuba.]

FIVE U.S. DIPLOMATS ORDERED TO LEAVE COUNTRY

PM200919 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

["At the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] A statement was made to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 19 October 1986 concerning the unlawful activities of a number of officials at U.S. diplomatic missions in the Soviet Union. As the statement noted, Embassy officials W. Norvill, C. Ehrenfreund, G. Longvist and D. Harris, as well as D. Roberts [names as received], an official at the U.S. General Consulate in Leningrad, are engaged in activities of this kind on the territory of the USSR.

A firm protest has been made to the U.S. Embassy in this connection. For activities incompatible with their official status, the named Embassy and General Consulate officials have been declared personae non gratae, and they have been ordered to leave the Soviet Union.

The attention of the U.S. Embassy was again drawn to instances of the continuing use of U.S. diplomatic missions in the USSR in order to conduct illicit activities against the USSR, and the demand was made that it should take appropriate measures to put an end to them.

CONTINUED REACTION AGAINST U.S. REYKJAVIK STANCE

General Chervov Article

PM171401 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of directorate at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, under the rubric "Authoritative Opinion": "Seeking a Way Out of the Deadlock. Col Gen Nikolay Federovich Chervov, Chief of Directorate at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, Reflects on Key Problems in Curbing the Arms Race"]

[Text] Of course, the disarmament problem is complex, but not so complex as to make it impossible to sort out. The main idea which, in my opinion, all politicians and all realistically minded people must grasp is that today the arms race no longer makes any sense. In our age the economic, military, and technical potential of the Soviet Union and the United States is such that the attainment of military superiority by one over the other is simply impossible -- neither side would allow this. Hence it is pointless -- and even criminal! -- to seek a solution to the problem of security by improving the "shield" and the "sword." Today the question is as follows: Either peaceful coexistence, or nonexistence, apocalypse. The present nuclear balance is in any case intolerably high, and a continuation of the arms race and especially its extension into space could take it to a point where parity ceases to be a factor in military-political deterrence. Consequently, it is necessary to halt and reduce the level of military confrontation before it is too late.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that a new approach to the problem of security is needed in the contemporary nuclear and space age. It advocates that the sides' military potentials be reduced to the level of sufficiency necessary for defense purposes and that nuclear and other types of mass annihilation weapons be excluded from the strategic balance. [paragraph continues]

We back our statements with specific deeds. The USSR unilaterally halted the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, downgraded a proportion of its SS-20 missiles from standby alert status, and on four occasions extended the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests which will have remained in force for 18 months -- through 1 January 1987. Moving halfway toward the United States and the NATO countries, we put forward compromise proposals at the talks in Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm. The Soviet Union proposed a program for the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons by the end of this century and put forward specific proposals aimed at the liquidation of chemical weapons and their production base. The Warsaw Pact countries are offering the European NATO states a reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) of 25 percent, or more than 1 million men.

The purpose of these major and fundamental foreign policy actions by the Soviet Union is to improve the international situation, to interrupt the trend toward a buildup of military danger, and to halt the arms race. The Soviet moratorium is the best confirmation that we have no other intention than to end the policy of nuclear confrontation. The imposition of a ban on nuclear tests is the most realistic way to attain termination of the arms race, because new types of weapons cannot be either improved or created [sozdavat] without tests. Were we, together with the United States, to agree on a termination of nuclear explosions, this would make it possible to set in motion the entire process of nuclear disarmament. Great importance would also be attached to the political aspect of the matter, because halting nuclear tests would mean introducing into Soviet-U.S. relations the elements of confidence which are missing to such an extent.

But the Soviet course of terminating the arms race encounters no support from the U.S. Administration. The United States is unwilling to terminate nuclear explosions and continues tests for the purpose of creating [sozdaniye] new nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is trying to camouflage its militarist stance beneath various fabrications. Earlier, the U.S. Administration took refuge behind the verification [kontrol] problem which it had invented: It was claimed that the Russians would not agree on verification [kontrol], so there was nothing to talk about with them. After the USSR declared that it agreed to any type of verification [kontrol], including international and on-site inspections, it became clear that Washington's ruling circles were simply being clever. Now they are forced to admit openly that the moratorium does not suit them and they will continue nuclear explosions. The United States has already carried out more nuclear explosions than all the [other] nuclear powers together. Furthermore, if we compare the USSR and the United States, regardless of what period we take -- 5, 10, or 15 years -- superiority in the number of nuclear tests is clearly on the U.S. side. It has carried out more explosions than the USSR in every individual environment -- in the atmosphere, underground, and under water. Therefore, those who hold forth about some kind of U.S. "lag" in nuclear tests in fact want to retain for the United States reserves for the creation [sozdaniye] of new mass destruction weapons and so continue the arms race. A desire to upset the prevailing equilibrium of forces to its advantage is the only explanation of the U.S. Administration's stubborn unwillingness to renounce nuclear explosions, which are conducted for the purpose of creating [sozdaniye] new types of weapons: MX strategic missiles (which are, incidentally, partially already on standby alert status), new Trident-2 missiles, and nuclear charges for Midgetman missiles and also for strike space means being developed [razrabatyvayemyy] within the "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI] framework.

Real obstacles to the arms race could have been erected at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, but the U.S. Administration deadlocked these talks through its blocking tactics. [paragraph continues]

It is pursuing a line of trying to force the USSR to accept unilateral conditions, a line of striving for military superiority over the USSR. Thus, the White House is very partial to reminding people that the Soviet Union enjoys superiority in ground-launched ICBM's which, apparently, "fly very fast": Such a missile takes only 30 minutes to reach the United States from USSR territory, or vice versa. Nothing is said, however, about the fact that the Americans have twice as many warheads on identical but sea-launched missiles which, incidentally, fly even faster and can reach the USSR's territory only 15-20 minutes after launching. Nor do they like to recall that the United States has a severalfold advantage in terms of heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles. So the result is that America feels frightened when looking at our missiles, "forgetting" what it has itself.

The Soviet Union looks at matters soberly. At the Reykjavik summit meeting, M.S. Gorbachev proposed a reduction of at least 50 percent in USSR and U.S. strategic weapons -- with the aim in mind, moreover, of totally liquidating these deadliest of weapons by the year 2000. The Soviet side displayed flexibility on the solution of this question in a desire to find mutually acceptable solutions taking the U.S. side's stance into account. For example, the United States objected to reductions in medium-range arms and in its forward-based means together with ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers. We took this into consideration and deleted from the agenda the question of forward-based means.

The United States objected to a ban on long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes. We agreed on allowing a limited number of such air- and sea-launched missiles, while the question of ground-launched cruise missiles is to be solved together with that of other medium-range means.

As regards the U.S. proposals on strategic weapons, they are totally oriented toward gaining unilateral advantages for the United States. Their implementation would not only fail to halt the arms race but would actually give it the green light for the future. According to the U.S. approach, the number of nuclear charges on U.S. strategic delivery vehicles would increase to 15,000 or more units. The United States would preserve all its military programs, while the Soviet Union would be bound to demolish [sloimat] its strategic nuclear forces and rebuild them according to a U.S. model.

The clearly unconstructive nature of the U.S. stance is evident against the background of the Soviet proposal. The U.S. President was forced to agree with [soglasitsya s] the Soviet stance in Reykjavik.

Now as to medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union offers a radical solution: The complete liquidation of USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. What does this mean? Neither U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles nor Soviet SS-20 missiles would be left in the European zone. The USSR went even further at the summit meeting in Reykjavik, consenting to reach agreement on the U.S. "zero option" and expressing readiness to liquidate all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe while leaving aside the corresponding British and French nuclear weapons. This is a major compromise, a concession on our part with a view to eliminating the obstacles in the way of accord. The Soviet Union agreed to the U.S. proposal and offered [poshel na] to leave only 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Asia, while the United States would retain the same number of warheads (100) on medium-range missiles in all territories. We also agreed with the Americans to start talks on missiles on a range of less than 1,000 km.

It follows that the Soviet Union is not contemplating any advantages for itself in this sphere either. We want just one thing: to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation and strengthen strategic stability. The liquidation of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe would be an important step in this direction and could constitute a major turn for the better, both on the European continent and in the world as a whole.

All these major Soviet concessions made it possible to move closer to the elaboration of agreements on the nuclear arms problem in Reykjavik. It would have taken a matter of days to finalize these agreements in the form of agreements which could have been signed during the main summit meeting in Washington.

It would, however, be unreasonable to reduce arms in one direction while giving the green light to arms race in another, namely in space. The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that its proposed radical (50-percent) reduction of nuclear arms makes it necessary to rule out the possibility that one of the sides could achieve military superiority through space, notably via the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons. For this purpose M.S. Gorbachev proposed a strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime -- whereby agreement would be reached that over a 10-year period the sides would not exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty and would strictly carry out all its intent [pozhelaniye]. Moreover, research and testing within the SDI framework would not extend beyond laboratory boundaries.

Is this formulation of the issue correct? It is correct and legitimate from both the political and the military viewpoint. As M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, "...if we are to embark on reductions, then we must take pains to ensure that all the brakes which are in operation today and stand in the way of the creation [sozdaniye] of new types of weapons are not only preserved but are strengthened."

But the U.S. side, regardless of the fairness of the Soviet approach, rejected our proposal, effectively eliminating any opportunity to elaborate an agreement on nuclear arms reduction. Thus, through the fault of the U.S. Administration, a major historic chance to reduce nuclear arms and turn in the direction of detente was missed. It was shown yet again for all the world to see that the United States has not abandoned its imperial ambitions and the attempts to attain military superiority over the USSR.

The United States has chosen space as one of the main avenues for attaining superiority over the Soviet Union. Why has this gamble been taken? Because hitherto the nuclear arms race has failed to produce any advantages for Washington, despite all the tricks. Not a single one of the new strategic weapons systems adopted in the United States has added or will add to its confidence in its own invulnerability in a nuclear war. The Soviet Union gives an appropriate response to its actions. This is why U.S. security is not being enhanced as a result of the development [razrabotka] of new types of weapons; on the contrary, it is being eroded.

Back in March 1983, when President Reagan first announced his plans for preparation for "star wars," he declared that SDI was a defensive program and its ultimate goal was the liquidation of nuclear weapons, which would then supposedly become unnecessary. The White House still declares this today. But such talk is nothing but an attempt to fool public opinion. The space means which are being created [sozdayutsya] within the SDI framework and which Washington describes as "defensive" are offensive weapons par excellence. These are universal [universalnoye] weapons which can destroy satellites in space and hit targets on earth, weapons with a range up to 4,000 km or more.
[paragraph continues]

How can weapons with such a range be defensive? It is perfectly clear that calculations here are based on the creation [sozdaniye] of a fundamentally new class of weapons -- strike space weapons. The task is to create [sozdat] a space shield above America's territory and to blackmail the USSR with the delivery of a first nuclear strike from beneath this shield -- a strike which should, according to U.S. strategists' calculations, go unpunished.

Journalists often ask: Does a program similar to the U.S. SDI exist in the Soviet Union? The USSR has no "star wars" programs, and it has no plans to create [sozdaniye] strike space weapons. We do not intend to get into space and threaten the United States or other countries from there. If the United States does not believe us and assumes that major work is being done in this sphere in our country, why does it not accept our proposal to ban mutually any work on the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons? The USSR has also put forward another proposal: If the United States agreed to ban all strike space weapons, laboratories could be opened to verification [kontrol] for checking [proverka] purposes. But the United States has failed to respond to this proposal.

In its opposition to a threat from space, the Soviet side offers to reach agreement on a complete ban on strike space weapons now, immediately, or -- if the U.S. side is not prepared for this -- to agree on partial measures leading to the solution of this task. The USSR offered to reach agreement on banning weapons of the "space-earth" class, in other words space-based means which could be used to hit targets on the earth's surface, in the atmosphere, or at sea, and also on banning antisatellite systems.

Let me make it clear: Now there are no weapons in space, neither Soviet, nor American. The USSR's stance is that there should be no weapons there in the future, either. What does the United States propose? Even though our leaders pledged at the Geneva meeting not to allow an arms race in space, the United States has hitherto failed to submit at the talks any proposals in this direction. It evades a businesslike examination of the problem of banning strike space weapons, and in exchange assures us stubbornly and persistently that under no circumstances would it abandon the "star wars" program. Even in his 9 September Denver speech President Reagan confirmed that the United States will continue to work on the "star wars" program and will definitely test space weapons. The very same stance was taken by the U.S. President in Reykjavik too. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger went even further, declaring that these weapons will be deployed. Instead of a ban on the arms race in space, we are offered at the talks the elaboration of rules to conduct this race, in other words an agreement on what kinds of space weapons are to be deployed, in what quantities, and according to what schedules.

The White House's unwillingness to part with the "star wars" plans and embark on a compromise on this question has virtually nullified the results of the Reykjavik summit meeting where, it would seem, agreements had already been reached on nuclear arms reductions.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from all that has been said above: The arms race is programmed into the U.S. stance at the talks. This is also confirmed by Washington's practical actions and particularly by its refusal to observe in the future the 1972 interim agreement and the SALT II treaty. If we were to take into account the fact that work on the "star wars" program -- like the "Delta" experiment and others, for example -- has come right up against the ABM Treaty and could explode it at any time, it becomes obvious that the United States is aiming at having no accords whatsoever, at not binding itself by any legal pledges on arms limitation questions.

While destroying the treaty and legal base of the process of strategic arms limitation and reduction, the United States offers nothing in exchange. Could it be that America is not interested in consolidating and preserving existing accords on strategic arms limitation? The White House has nothing sensible to say in justification of its course.

The nuclear arms race cannot continue indefinitely. The world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons today are so large that, were they to be used, they could destroy all living things on earth many times over. No matter from which side the problem is examined, there is only one option: The nuclear arms race must be halted, a way out of confrontation must be sought. There is no alternative, because the alternative is a race into a nuclear catastrophe.

Despite the absence of overall positive decisions in Reykjavik, people in the Soviet Union hope that the U.S. side will carefully analyze the results of that meeting and our proposals. We expect that common sense and a new approach to the problem of war and peace will gain the upper hand in Washington.

Kornilov Commentary

LD191612 Moscow TASS in English 1556 GMT 19 Oct 86

[Ellipses as received]

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS -- Follows commentary by TASS News Analyst Yuriy Kornilov:

The higher the wave of indignation and protests is mounting the world over, especially in the European countries, against Washington's stand in Reykjavik, a stand, as a result of which it has become impossible to rid Europe of nuclear weapons, the more vigorously and cunningly they in Washington are trying to bring down that wave by means of propaganda ploys. Another proof of that is the interview given in Rome by U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger, and in Washington -- by U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Perle.

Albeit they made their statements in different places, they pursued one aim: to impress on the West Europeans that the USA is very much concerned with reaching a Soviet-American agreement on the withdrawal of all medium-range missile from Europe. Such a step, Caspar Weinberger claims, is by no means incompatible with the stand taken by the USA in Reykjavik. An agreement on medium range missiles, Richard Perle echoes him, could be concluded already next year....

This is a surprise propaganda zigzag. If one is to listen to the Pentagon chief and his closest aide, he may be led to think that it is the USA and not the USSR which proposed a radical settlement at Reykjavik, whose essence is to leave neither the American Pershing and cruise missiles, nor the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe.

If one is to listen to these gentlemen, he could be led to think that the USSR did not display at Reykjavik preparedness for a major compromise and remove all the Soviet and American medium range missiles from Europe, while leaving aside the corresponding nuclear weapons of Britain and France....

Yet the essence, the core of the attempts at misleading public opinion taken by Weinberger and Perle is not that, or not so much that. While expatiating at length about Washington's wish to deliver Europe from medium range nuclear weapons, these gentlemen deliberately "forget" that the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union at Reykjavik are of a complex character, are a package. This does not mean that the talks will not be conducted on each of the three areas, on which they are already being conducted at Geneva -- on space weapons, strategic offensive weapons and medium range weapons in Europe.

A separate agreement can be prepared on each of these issues. yet the decision on putting them into the effect should be taken in complex, with due regard for all the basic components of the nuclear problem.

It is certainly, not accidental that Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Perle have displayed such "forgetfulness," since both of them are zealous advocates of the Washington-sponsored aggressive programme for "star wars" preparations. But what is the real worth of the "preparedness" of the USA to cut weapons only in one area -- while it is immediately giving a green light to the weapons race in an another area -- an even by far more dangerous one -- in outer space? Can one tally Washington's speculation on the need for stabilizing the situation in Europe and its intention to destroy the Soviet-American ABM treaty of unlimited duration which makes it possible to contain the weapons race in a way?

No, these two things do not tally with one another. The Pentagon hawks' false "preparedness" to settle the question of medium-range missiles is own militaristic plans. This is, frankly speaking, a clumsy manoeuvre...

Shvets Hits Shultz Speech

LD180015 Moscow TASS in English 0000 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 18 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yuriy Shvets reports:

The U.S. Administration continues an all-out propaganda campaign whose aim is to impose on the international public its interpretation of the results and significance of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. Speaking to Washington journalists at the National Press Club, Secretary of State George Shultz called the results of the summit "unusual," since, according to him, it was possible during the negotiations to bring much closer the positions of the sides of a broad range of arms control questions and on bilateral relations.

However, when Shultz told the gathering the administration's "new interpretation" of arms control problems, it became clear that he meant an old desire of the USA to gain a unilateral advantage over the USSR. He spoke of developing only those positive results of the summit which conformed to the U.S. interests and ignored legitimate lawful interests of the USSR in the sphere of security.

ROGACHEV BRIEFS PRC'S QIAN QICHEN ON REYKJAVIK

PM200801 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "Political Consultations"]

[Text] Beijing, 15 Oct -- I.A. Rogachev, the Soviet Government's special envoy and USSR deputy foreign minister, and O.A. Troyanovskiy, USSR ambassador to the United States, met with PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and briefed him on the results of the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik summit.

The Soviet side stressed that the Iceland meeting was an exceptionally important event in international life. The Soviet Union set out the major, far-reaching proposals on a number of the central issues linked with nuclear arms limitation and reduction, which were put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. It was noted that the position adopted by U.S. President R. Reagan on the SDI question did not make it possible to achieve any specific solutions.

The Chinese side expressed the hope that the USSR and the United States would continue their efforts in seeking mutually acceptable accords in order to achieve substantive progress on the arms control question. This, in Qian Qichen's opinion, would promote an easing of tension in the world.

I.A. Rogachev left Beijing after the conclusion of the ninth round of Soviet-Chinese consultations.

Hu Qili Cited on Talks

LD172207 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo October 17 TASS -- Hu Qili, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said in connection with the Reykjavik summit, among other things, that China consistently favours the continuation of a dialogue, since it is by far better than confrontation. No agreement has been reached at [the] Reykjavik meeting, nevertheless preparedness was declared to continue the dialogue. We also wish for its continuation. We would like an ultimate result be achieved at the future talks to make a contribution to the cause of peace all over the world, without doing damage to the interests of other states.

As far as the SDI problem is concerned, Hu Qili continued, we hold that the exploration of outer space should contribute to peace all over the world, while its use with military aims boosts the weapons race. Therefore we oppose the Strategic Defence Initiative.

MOSCOW MANDARIN REPORTS UK QUEEN'S CHINA VISIT

OW190128 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1600 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Text] The British Queen continues her visit to China. Sources said that Queen Elizabeth, who is touring various parts of China, stayed in the ancient capital of Xian for 3 hours on Thursday before arriving in Kunming. On Friday Elizabeth 11 toured Kunming city and visited the Yunnan college for nationalities. On Saturday the British Queen will go to Hong Kong by way of Guangzhou.

Earlier she visited Beijing and met with Chinese leaders. On board a British royal yacht in Shanghai, she gave a banquet, which was attended by PRC President Li Xiannian.

Meeting With Li Xiannian

PM141323 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Talks in Beijing"]

[Text] Beijing, 13 Oct -- PRC President Li Xiannian today met with Queen Elizabeth II of Britain, who is here on a state visit. During the talks the sides discussed questions of the development of Sino-British relations.

MOSCOW PAPER REPORTS PRC INVESTMENT STATUTE

PM171402 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Concessions for Foreign Investors"]

[Text] Beijing, 14 Oct -- Better conditions are being created in China for foreign investors investing capital in enterprises on Chinese territory. This is clear from a document drawn up in the PRC State Council the other day, headed "Provisions on Encouraging Foreign Investments in the PRC."

This document, XINHUA reports, says, in particular, that for enterprises with the participation of foreign capital, payment for the use of premises and land plots will be reduced by 5-20 yuan per square meter a year. The output from such enterprises which is to be exported is freed from trade and industrial taxation. Foreign investors are released from the payment of income tax on the sums of money involved when they transfer their share of the profit abroad.

This directive document instructs the relevant Chinese departments "as a priority to ensure that enterprises with the participation of foreign capital are supplied with the water, electricity, transport, and means of communication necessary for production and economic activity."

The Chinese newspapers note that these "Provisions" will give foreign businessmen "even better conditions, and will play an important role in attracting new foreign investments."

PRAVDA NOTES PRC PLAN TO REVISE SCHOOL BOOKS

PM151047 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Concerning the Reform of School Education in China"]

[Text] Beijing, 13 Oct -- The newspaper GUANGMING RIBAO has reported the formation of an all-China committee to review textbooks and teaching aids used in PRC primary and secondary schools. Its members -- experienced teachers, social scientists, and specialists in other spheres of knowledge -- have to substantially revise and renew the contents of textbooks currently in use and reedit them in the light of the latest achievements in teaching and other sciences.

It is planned in particular to expand the teaching of humanities and esthetic and labor education and to allocate more tuition time to studies of elementary technical knowledge and physical culture.

III. 20 Oct 86

U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A F F A I R S
N O R T H E A S T A S I A

C 1

COMMENTATOR ON ANNIVERSARY OF TIES WITH DPRK

SK160432 Moscow International Service in Korean 0930 GMT 11 Oct 86

[Text] Twelve October 1948 was an important day in Soviet-Korean relations. On that day the Soviet Union recognized the DPRK in advance of others and established diplomatic relations with the Republic. In this connection, our station commentator (Aleksandrov) says:

By establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK, our country weightily contributed to consolidating the Korean people's self-reliance and sovereignty and smashing the maneuvers of the United States and the South Korean reactionaries in attempting to internationally isolate the first worker-peasant country in Korea.

The DPRK victory marked the start of a new era in the relations between the peoples of our two countries -- the start of relations of friendship, fraternal mutual assistance, and true equality. What has played an important role in the history of Soviet-Korean relations are a series of agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the DPRK. Through the conclusions of those agreements, cooperation between the two sovereign states has been placed on a legal foundation.

Through the positive aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Korean people overcame difficulties in the 1950-1953 fatherland liberation war, rehabilitated the people's economy in a brief period, and won remarkable achievements in socialist construction. As our countries advance along the road of socialism, Soviet-Korean mutual cooperation has developed also in the international community.

What was important in consolidating the traditional fraternal relations was the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on 6 July 1961. This year our two countries grandly celebrated the 25th anniversary of the conclusion of this treaty. The treaty has legally fixed the (?fraternal cooperation) between the two peoples, which is based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism and has served as an effective tool in preserving peace and security in the Far East.

What has weighed important in the relations between our two countries in recent years was the official goodwill visit to the Soviet Union in May 1984 by the party and state delegation of the Republic led by Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the WPK Central Committee and president of the DPRK. The top-level talks and meetings held in Moscow at that time powerfully stimulated the relations between the two countries and opened a new vista for expanding and strengthening cooperation in the areas of politics, trade, economy, and culture and for seeking active relations and contacts between the states and parties. Subsequent mutual visits by the leaders of the Soviet Union and Korea have contributed to putting the agreements made at the top-level talks into practice and to further developing Soviet-Korean friendship.

The treaty-based legal foundation of the relations between our countries has been constantly strengthened. Over the past 1 and 1/2 years, the Soviet Union and the DPRK concluded a treaty for the abolishment [chopye] of the Soviet-Korean borderline. At the same time, a treaty for the definition of the boundaries of the economic zones and continental shelves has been concluded and an agreement for mutual visits by citizens of the Soviet Union and the DPRK has also been signed.

The unity and cohesion between our two fraternal peoples in the joint struggle against imperialism and for peace and security have been strengthened with each passing year.

The Soviet plan to liquidate nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century, the Soviet decision to extend the period of freezing nuclear testing to 1 January 1987, and the Soviet proposal to include the Asian and Pacific region in a comprehensive international security system have won broad support from the Korean friends.

Meanwhile, the political activities of People's Korea in the international community have shown that People's Korea is an important ally of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries in the struggle for international security and contributes to practically realizing the idea of turning Asia into a zone of peace and cooperation. The peace proposals which the DPRK has put forth to improve the situation in Korea and in the whole of Asia agree with the Soviet plan to handle the question of the Asian security comprehensively. The DPRK proposals for replacing the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement, for adopting a North-South declaration of nonaggression, for halting large military exercises on the Korean peninsula, and for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone have aroused broad international repercussions.

This year, along with the warriors struggling for the victory of the cause of peace, socialism, and communism, the peoples of the two fraternal countries mark the 38th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

TOMSK OBKOM CHIEF HEADS CPSU DELEGATION TO MPR

PM171025 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Interparty Ties"]

[Text] In accordance with the plan for interparty ties between the CPSU and MPRP, a delegation of CPSU party workers, headed by V.I. Zorkaltsev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Tomsk CPSU Obkom, was in the MPR 7 through 14 October to familiarize itself with the experience of MPRP activity in improving the work of organs of people's power and the state apparatus.

The delegation was received by J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee and chairman of the MPR People's Great Hural.

USSR-JAPAN MEDICS ROUNDTABLE MEETING HELD

LD102145 Moscow TASS in English 1237 GMT 10 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo October 10 TASS -- A round-table meeting attended by members of the medical profession from the Soviet Union and Hokkaido Island, Japan, was held in Sapporo. The motto of the meeting was "Medics of Japan and the Soviet Union in the effort to safeguard peace and avert the threat of a nuclear war".

The speakers at the meeting expressed the desire of medics in both countries to spare no efforts in order to inform the public about the disastrous consequences of a nuclear conflict.

Soviet and Japanese medics expressed their determination to do everything to prevent the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from recurring.

The Japanese physicians who took part in the meeting spoke with appreciation of the Soviet peace initiatives, primarily, of the moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

TV ON WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS FROM AFGHANISTAN

LD172344 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 17 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by special correspondents F. Seyful-Mulyukov and M. Leshchinskiy from Konduz, Afghanistan]

[Text] [Seyful-Mulyukov] The town of Konduz, the administrative center of the province of the same name, is situated only 70 km south of our country's border. For a long time now there has been no shooting in the streets of Konduz by dushman warriors; nor has there been criminal sabotage. The people's government has become firmly established both in the town and in the province as a whole. Elections to the local bodies of self-government were held here almost 1 and 1/2 years ago. New schools are being opened for both children and adults, medical services for the population have been set up and public organizations are very active. Thousands of people who were deceived by religious fanatics and feudal lords have not only gone over to the people's government, but, by bearing arms, have taken up its defense and voluntarily joined Democratic Afghanistan's Army.

The normalization of the situation in Konduz and indeed in other areas of Afghanistan, has made it possible for the governments of the two neighboring friendly countries to take a coordinated decision on returning some of the Soviet troops to the Soviet Union. The Soviet motor rifle regiment, deployed on the outskirts of Konduz, is today heading toward the Soviet border. The inhabitants of the town and neighboring villages have come to see our soldiers off. Together they rebuffed the dushman's forays and guarded roads and irrigation installations. On request from the villagers the Soviet sappers have frequently cleared away mines from gardens, fields, mosques and hospitals. [Video shows some 20 Soviet soldiers standing at attention; part of a tank is visible behind them; shots of Afghan children and adults at the ceremony]

[Leshchinskiy] The solemn military ritual is beginning. [Video shows Soviet soldier walking in front of several long lines of soldiers standing at attention] The return home of the Soviet internationalist soldiers is a stirring event. For the soldiers and officers it means the joy of an imminent meeting with their motherland and faith in the friends who called for their help at a difficult moment. Speaking at this rally, Comrade Najibullah, secretary general of the PDPA Central Committee; Karvar Mariam, an inhabitant of Konduz; and Senior Lieutenant Abdul Habib spoke of the thoughts of many Afghans. Here are some of the facts they mentioned. Thousands of letters from ordinary people have already been received by the local and central authorities expressing gratitude to the Soviet soldiers. Rural cooperative societies in Herat and Konduz provinces have been given the name "Afghan-Soviet Friendship," as has the road along which the Soviet units are now heading for home. The guards motor rifle regiment is also starting out along this road. A solemn farewell march is being played. [Video shows Najibullah and other speakers addressing the assembly; approximately 100 Soviet soldiers shown marching along a road to the accompaniment of a military band]

The motorized riflemen are now taking their places in their combat vehicles, and the infantrymen will soon begin marching in formation. We are recording a short interview with Major General Daud. He commands the 20th Afghan infantry Division, which is linked to this Soviet motor rifle regiment by genuine combat fraternity. It should be noted that Gen Muhammad Daud has only recently returned from the hospital after suffering severe injuries.

[Begin Daud recording in vernacular with superimposed Russian translation] We are army men, and today we are seeing off not merely friends but soldiers, together with whom we have battled against the cunning enemy, shed blood and routed the enemies of liberty and independence. Some 2,000 Soviet soldiers have been awarded combat orders and medals by revolutionary Afghanistan, and their heroism and courage will always serve as an example to us. [end recording]

[Leshchinskiy] The command to start up has just been given, and the first combat vehicles are now departing for home. [video shows six APC's on the move]

TV on Tank Unit's Return

LD182323 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by special correspondents F. Seyful-Mulyukov and M. Leshchchinskiy from Kushka, Kazakhstan]

[Text] Kushka, the southernmost town in our country, today greeted Soviet soldiers-internationalists returning from Afghanistan. Here is a report by our special correspondents. [Video shows main battle tanks moving in single file along road]

[Leshchinskiy] The Guards tankmen are approaching the border. The guards banner is above the leading vehicle. The road traveled to the native land has been through Afghan towns and kishlaks, mountain ravines and deserts. These places are memorable for the tankmen. In their burning hot tanks they did their combat service by guarding roads and kishlaks, towns and industrial enterprises. They defended freedom, peaceful work, and the peoples' future.

[Guards Lieutenant-Colonel Puzyrev, regiment commander, identified by caption] We were seen off with smiles, with flowers, and with warm handshakes; we were seen off with salutes of: Farewell dear Soviet soldiers, we wish you a happy journey to your homeland that you may see your families, children and wives. And now, as I approach the USSR state border with my unit, I am very pleased and happy about this, just as my entire regiment's personnel are also happy about it.

[Seyful-Mulyukov, standing at border post, with tanks crossing border in background] And now the leading vehicle of the Guards tank regiment is crossing the USSR state border. The Soviet soldiers-internationalists are returning home. How many times during these last few days, back there in Afghanistan, have we heard from our soldiers words about their parental home and about our homeland. The first meters of native soil -- it greets its soldiers at the end of a long and difficult journey, which they traveled with dignity and honor, as its dearest sons. [Video shows civilians welcoming soldiers with bread and salt]

As the tanks were crossing the border, thousands of people were already gathering to meet the Soviet soldiers -- inhabitants of the old Russian fortress of Kushka, in the southernmost part of our country. [Video shows military and civilian dignitaries on podium at meeting]

Here in the border valley a stirring meeting was held. Leaders of local party and public organizations, Soviet military commanders, representatives of the working people, and Great Patriotic War and labor veterans warmly welcomed the soldiers-internationalists. [Video shows soldiers being welcomed by civilians]

They have accomplished a feat of arms and have undergone combat and political training, and now, on their homeland, which is waging a titanic struggle for peace and the happiness of peoples, they will fittingly fulfill their military and patriotic duty. [Video shows Seyful-Mulyukov standing in front of M-1974 self-propelled howitzer, with soldier and parents behind him]

We know that our report is being watched at the moment by many of our soldiers' mothers, both of those who came back today and of those who continue to fulfill their patriotic and internationalist duty in Afghanistan. The Yuzikayev family, mother and father, have come to Kushka to meet their son, Ruslan, who serves with the Guards tank regiment and today returned to his native soil. What do you feel at this moment?

[Mrs Yuzilkayeva] This meeting will remain forever in the hearts of our mothers; I will never forget this meeting, that today I am meeting my son in Kushka.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Vasiliy Kuzmich Golubkov has met his son, Guards Senior Lieutenant Sergey Golubkov, from the tank division.

[Golubkov senior] I have met my dear son, who has come back from Afghanistan, which is our friend. He has been fulfilling his internationalist duty in Afghanistan, and he has been defending the gains of Afghanistan's April Revolution. I am proud of my son. His commanders speak very highly of him, saying that we have brought up a good son, and we are glad to hear this. [Video shows soldiers marching past, flowers in their hands]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] The soldiers who returned home were welcomed with the lavish gifts of our land, smiles and flowers, pride and love.

Radio on Tank Regiment Return

LD181313 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] The withdrawal from Afghanistan of the six regiments from the limited Soviet military contingent, which is there temporarily on request of the Afghan Government, has become a new act of good will of the Soviet side. A guards tank regiment arrived in Kushka today. The homeland welcomed the Soviet fighters as valiant soldiers of peace, who fulfilled with honor their international duty.

The festive meeting is starting. The Soviet Union's anthem is heard. The inhabitants of the border rayon are presenting bread and salt and flowers to the fighters-internationalists. Courageous fighters are greeted by the pioneers. The homeland is proud of its famous sons. The heroism of fighters-internationalists will become forever a symbol of the inviolable Soviet-Afghan friendship, said Mollayeva, secretary of Communist Party of Turkmenistan Central Committee, in welcoming the guards members. The tank crews were addressed warmly by Djumagaliyev, veteran of the Great Patriotic War; Tengilbayev, worker from the Chemen-i-bit from Kushka Rayon, who served in Afghanistan; Golubkov, labor veteran; and others.

Speaking on behalf of the Guard's fighters-internationalists, Bayram Gildyev, a private, and Lieutenant-Colonel Puzyrev, commander of the guards regiment, assured the welcoming party that the Soviet soldiers, loyal to the homeland and to the idea of internationalism, will always fulfill honorably their military civic duty, and that they will guard peace reliably.

TASS on Antiaircraft Regiment

LD191639 Moscow TASS in English 1608 GMT 19 Oct 86

[Text] Kabul October 19 TASS -- TASS correspondents German Baykov, Andrey Greshnov and Oleg Muzmin report:

The Bala Hisar fortress of Kabul, one of the oldest fortresses of Afghanistan, is decorated in a festive way. It is decked with Soviet and Afghan national flags and the slogans "Long live Afghan-Soviet friendship" and "Glory to soldier internationalists".

The fourth of the Soviet regiments, an anti-aircraft one, is returning home today. Representatives of the Afghan public and soldiers of the Afghan armed forces took part in a celebration meeting.

Najibullah, general secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, as well as other officials, addressed the meeting. A message of greeting of the CPSU Central Committee to the soldier internationalists who were returning home was read out.

Speaking at the meeting, Najibullah said that Afghanistan had never wanted a war. In the difficult days when the mortal threat was hanging over Afghanistan the Soviet Union shared with it the most sacred thing it had -- the kindness-oriented strength of its sons. Soviet soldiers set an example of true internationalism. It was genuine fraternity.

Thousands of Soviet soldiers, hundreds of tanks and other combat vehicles going north is a gesture of goodwill, a concrete example of a new political thinking, the implementation of the policy mapped out by the 27th CPSU Congress.

Najibullah said that quite recently they had followed with interest the meeting in Reykjavik between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the U.S. Peoples of the planet have been united by the hope of peace and disarmament. This striving of humanity cannot be arrested. The advance of revolutionary peoples cannot be stopped. The forces of peace and progress are sure to win in Afghanistan too, in this region, in the whole of the planet.

Najibullah said further that Afghanistan continued to wage a bitter war. Afghan people took up arms for defending peace, honour, freedom, national dignity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of their country. Soviet soldier internationalists passed over to them their combat experience. According to the Afghan leader, the return to the area of permanent deployment of six regiments is a sign of their growing strength.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and of the whole of the Afghan nation Najibullah handed in to the personnel of the regiment a commemorative banner of the Central Committee of the party, the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers of Afghanistan, as well as the sculpture "Comradeship-in-Arms".

Participants in the meeting welcomed the joint decision of the Governments of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and emphasized that it was convincing evidence of the striving for the speeding up of a political settlement of the situation in the region.

A training centre of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan will be located in the former area of the deployment of the regiment which was turned over to the Afghan side.

TASS OBSERVER: U.S., ZIA TRY TO DISCREDIT STEP

LD182238 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Commentary by TASS political Observer Yuriy Kornilov]

[Text] The broader the positive response in various world countries in connection with the decision by the USSR to return a part of its forces from the DRA, the more energetic become the attempts to discredit this constructive step of the Soviet side by those circles in the United States -- and not only in the United States -- which still have not lost hope of turning back the development of events in Afghanistan. A further testimony of this is the statement by Pakistani President Ziaul Haq, who, as is reported by the AP agency, alleged in an interview with U.S. journalists that the USSR, before the return of six Soviet regiments from the DRA, had sent to the country a new 15,000 strong contingent of troops. Here is TASS Political Observer Yuriy Kornilov with a commentary:

[Konilov] I must first of all note that the Pakistani president, who has put into circulation the fabrication under discussion, is by no means original. Recently, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger -- who by the way has just visited Pakistan -- dug up a fabrication invented in the bowels of the Pentagon that the return of six Soviet regiments from the DRA is of no significance because a few weeks ago the USSR sent to Afghanistan several regiments to compensate. Following Weinberger, a similar lie was spread by the U.S. State Department too, which made a statement that the return of six Soviet regiments from the DRA is, you see, not at all a return, but some sort of regrouping of forces. So, as you see, Ziaul Haq, in referring to the fact that his statement is based on some sources known only to him, turns out to be blatantly at variance with the truth. In reality, the Pakistani president is simply repeating the fabrications of his Washington patrons.

Now a few words on the essence of the matter. At the news conference held the other day in Moscow in connection with the return of a part of the Soviet forces from the DRA, a Soviet representative, exposing the Pentagon's fabrication, stressed that several regiments are not a needle in a haystack; it is not possible to conceal their movement from modern means of observation, and it can only be regretted that a leader of such standing as the U.S. defense secretary resorts to provocative inventions. It would seem that what was said was clearer than clear, but although Weinberger's lie has not been around long, the temptation to speculate on ill-intentioned fabrications, as we see, does not leave certain gentlemen, not only in Washington but also in Islamabad. What can be said in this respect? Just one thing: Attempts to blacken the peace-loving and consistent policies of the USSR and of the DRA in the end work against their initiators, yet again showing who is hindering a political settlement around Afghanistan and creating obstacles on the road to consolidating mutual understanding and trust between countries and peoples.

ANDRIANOV COMMENTS ON WEINBERGER TOUR OF ASIA

LD142241 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1731 GMT 14 Oct 86

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Konstantin Patsyuk; commentary by Boris Andrianov]

[Text] Weinberger, the U.S. defense secretary, who is touring Asian countries, has ended his visit to India and arrived in Pakistan.

In their reports on the latest stage of the Asian tour by the head of the Pentagon, the Western news agencies are laying particular emphasis on one significant detail. It concerns the last day of Weinberger's stay in Delhi. REUTERS, in particular, reports that at the very end of his visit to India, the U.S. defense secretary canceled two previously agreed meetings with members of the Indian Government. Explaining this fact to newsmen, one of the Americans accompanying Weinberger stated that the latter allegedly wasn't feeling too well. However, he hastened to add that the head of the U.S. war department was prepared to carry out in full the program laid down by a 3-day visit to Pakistan.

In setting all this down, the writer of this dispatch very clearly hints that Weinberger's indisposition in Delhi was of a diplomatic nature, since he feels able to shake off his ailment the moment he arrives in Islamabad, where, along with other questions, the Pentagon head intends to discuss with the leaders of the Pakistani military regime the so-called "Afghan problem." All the indications are that this problem is now the subject of the heightened interest of the Washington administration.

Confirmation of this is the behavior of the United States, which has steeply increased its efforts to emasculate the constructive content of the Soviet Union's peace initiatives regarding the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Western politicians find it hard to stomach the latest achievements of popular authority in that sovereign country. These show that the changes which have taken place in Afghanistan are irreversible. Many facts testify that the political situation there is now stabilizing. Noticeable trends towards improvement are in evidence, for example the obvious expansion and consolidation of the sociopolitical base of the Afghan revolution. This is a highly significant factor, as the authorities have succeeded in securing the support of influential circles in the private sector, as well as the Islamic clergy.

It is not noteworthy that in Afghanistan a favorable atmosphere has been created for constructive dialogue with various political and social forces, with individual figures, including those who adhered, and still adhere, to a negative position vis-a-vis the April Revolution?

After all, the need for such dialogue is fully apparent, apparent because even in the camp of the counterrevolution there are quite a number of people who have been duped by imperialist propaganda. In this connection, it should be noted that at the end of last month a decree was adopted in Kabul on the establishment of an all-Afghan commission of national reconciliation. This is designed to promote the cause of restoring peace and security within the country, and that of the struggle against interference by the forces of imperialism and reaction in Afghanistan.

The call for national reconciliation issued by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has also been favorably received by many Afghans temporarily resident abroad. As THE WASHINGTON POST has been compelled to admit, this has dealt a blow to the camp of the Afghan counterrevolution. It must be assumed that this caused considerable concern to the U.S. Administration, which sent Weinberger as its emissary to Pakistan, where the main bases of the bandit formations of the Afghan reaction are situated. The dushman ringleaders no doubt expect the Pentagon head not to come emptyhanded, for imperialist circles are prepared for new expenses in the attempt to halt the process of normalization in Afghanistan, and they are making such attempts, attempts as desperate as they are doomed, because they are striving to impose an alien will upon the Afghan people.

MOSCOW LAO SERVICE ON GORBACHEV-KAYSONE MEETING

BK181008 Moscow in Lao to Laos 1300 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Ella Zhukova commentary]

[Text] A meeting and talks were reportedly held in Moscow on 15 October between Soviet and Lao leaders -- Mikhail Gorbachev and Kaysone Phomvihan. Such a regular meeting is a manifestation of the continuous development of Soviet-Lao cooperation and of both sides' common objectives in their struggle for peace and social progress. The meeting took place in a historic period of great significance to the Lao people as they are making preparations for the fourth LPRP congress.

This congress will discuss the laying down of objectives for the next 5 years from 1986 to 1990 and methods for materializing them. The congress will also map out a strategic line for now until 2000 for Laos' social and economic development. In achieving national progress, the Lao Communists have creatively applied their Soviet counterpart's experience.

As stated by Kaysone Phomvihan, the 27th CPSU Congress indicated ways to correctly resolve, in theory and practice, problems on building a communist state. The Lao leader emphasized the importance of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Lao people's national construction efforts. It is already known that the bilateral cooperation was specially developed in a swift manner during Laos' 1st 5-year Plan, ending in 1985. For example, before 1981 there were only 6 programs planned by both sides, while 30 programs were jointly built during the 1st 5-Year Plan, emphasizing the development of Laos' basic economic branches, such as transportation, highway construction, agriculture, forestry industry, and the exploitation of national resources. The programs carried out under joint Soviet-Lao cooperation also include the construction of Laos' largest bridges across Nam Ngum and Nam Kading Rivers, the construction of an agricultural state enterprise called the Lat Sen settlement in Xieng Khouang Province, and the construction of an agricultural machinery maintenance center near Vientiane.

A country's success in achieving social and economic progress directly depends on the international situation. This is why in their Moscow meeting the Soviet and Lao leaders paid considerable attention to the situation in the Asian and Pacific region where tension is increasing due to the work of external forces. For example, efforts are being made to obstruct the normalization of the relations between the three Indochinese countries and ASEAN and to incite an open confrontation between these two groups of countries.

After considering such a situation, Mikhail Gorbachev and Kaysone Phomvihan expressed support for closer cooperation among socialist countries in Asia and for their development of cooperation with all countries in the region as a basic principles so that they can help find ways to resolve regional problems. It should be observed that Laos and the other two Indochinese countries are playing an important role in this matter, as they have regularly advanced peace proposals. For example, the foreign ministers of the three Indochinese countries met in Hanoi in August and asked the ASEAN member countries to hold constructive talks. The laying down of guarantees for a lasting peace in Asia and the Pacific will constitute an inseparable component of an all-embracing system of international security.

As both sides share a common attitude on the general world situation, the Lao leader expressed support for the Soviet stand regarding the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik.

CONTINUED REPORTAGE OF RYZHKOV WARSAW VISIT

Departs From Warsaw

LD160022 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Warsaw, 15 Oct (TASS) -- Today, N.I. Ryzhkov, who was in Poland on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the PZPR Central Committee and the PPR Government, left Warsaw for home. At the capital's airport he was seen off by M. Wozniak, Z. Messner, T. Porebski and J. Czyrek, members of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo; J. Kubasiewicz, candidate member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo; W. Gwiazda, M. Gorywoda, Z. Szalajda, deputy chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers, and other officials.

The state flags of the USSR and PPR were raised at the airport, and a guard of honor of Polish servicemen was mounted. The orchestra played the anthem of the Soviet Union and Poland.

Returns to Moscow

LD152252 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" Newscast; Announcer-Read Report]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Comrade Ryzhkov returned to Moscow today. He was met at the airport by Comrades Aliyev, Zaykov, Talyzin and other officials. Among those who met him also was Zygoski, charge d'affaires of the Polish People's Republic to the USSR.

A joint statement, which will be published in the press, was adopted on the results of Comrade Ryzhkov's stay in the Polish People's Republic.

Joint Communique on Visit

LD152311 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[Text] N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, paid an official friendly visit to Poland 13-15 October 1986 at the invitation of the PZPR Central Committee and of the PPR Government. The visit proceeded in an atmosphere of cordiality, fraternal friendship and full mutual understanding.

N.I. Ryzhkov was received by W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and chairman of the PPS State Council. The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers conveyed cordial greeting from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. W. Jaruzelski, in his turn, conveyed best wishes to M.S. Gorbachev. During the meeting opinions were exchanged on topical problems of Soviet-Polish cooperation and on the development of the situation in the world.

The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers laid a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier. A wreath was also laid at the obelisk in the cemetery-mausoleum of the Soviet servicemen who fell in the battle to liberate Poland from the fascist invaders.

N.I. Ryzhkov acquainted himself with the achievements of the "Katowice" metallurgical combine collective and met with the party-economic aktiv. He also visited the Cemat scientific-production center of electronic materials in Warsaw. There was a meeting with the leadership of the Warsaw PZPR committee, of the people's council and the president of the capital.

There were talks between N.I. Ryzhkov and Z. Messner, in which the following took part:

On the Soviet side -- K.F. Katushev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; Yu.M. Vorontsov, first deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs; V.P. Lakhtin, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan, and V.I. Brovnikov, USSR ambassador to the PPR;

On the Polish side -- W. Gwiazda, deputy chairman of the PPR council of Ministers; M. Holdakowski, head of the Economic Department of the PZPR Central Committee [name and title as received]; A. Wojcik, PPR minister of foreign trade; J. Maciejewicz, PPR minister of metallurgy and machine industry; F. Kubiczek, first deputy chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers Planning Commission; H. Jarosek, PPR Deputy minister of foreign affairs; A. Zor, deputy minister in the PPR Council of Ministers administration, and W. Natorf, PPR ambassador to the USSR.

The heads of governments exchanged information on the course of fulfilling the tasks of the social and economic development of the USSR and PPR in the light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 10th PZPR Congress. There was discussion of key questions of bilateral relations and also key international problems.

The sides expressed satisfaction in connection with the consistent strengthening of relations of friendship and all-round cooperation between our peoples and states which are based on the principles of Marxism-Leninsim and socialist internationalism and the provisions of the alliance treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.

The particular importance of the meetings and conversations between M.S. Gorbachev and W. Jaruzelski for the dynamic development of Soviet-Polish relations was stressed. The guiding role of the CPSU and the PZPR and the course they have elaborated for the acceleration of social and economic development ensure favorable conditions for the further deepening of all-round cooperation between the USSR and PPR.

There was reaffirmation of the importance of constantly deepening the processes of integration and of adopting energetic measures to implement the long-term program for the development of economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and the PPR for the period up to the year 2000. The signing within the framework of this program of a considerable number of intergovernmental and sector agreements creates the firm basis for the further intensification of bilateral links.

Attention was drawn to the need to carry out all the provisions of the long-term programs for economic cooperation and scientific-technical progress. It was pointed out that the organization of joint work to implement them would be conducted with due regard for the tasks of the CEMA member countries' integrated program for scientific-technical progress up to the year 2000. The need to enhance constantly the quality of mutually supplied goods and articles, as well as their technical-economic parameters was stressed.

The heads of government devoted great attention to questions of the devising and development of new forms of economic cooperation in accordance with the decisions of the CEMA member countries' economic conference at the highest level. They consider that direct links between Soviet and Polish enterprises, combines, associations and design and research collectives, which were initiated in 1984, are mutually beneficial and promote the more efficient use of the economic and scientific reserves of the two countries which have not yet been brought into operation. The sides attach great importance to the setting up of joint industrial enterprises.

Agreements were signed between the USSR and PPR on direct production and scientific and technical ties between enterprises and organizations; on the basic principles of setting up joint economic organizations and other operations; on the development of mutual exchange of consumer goods between domestic trade enterprises and organizations.

Agreement was reached on establishing in the near future direct ties between other Soviet and Polish enterprises, and scientific research and agricultural organizations; and also on creating a number of coordinating councils and joint collectives of scientists and specialists to develop and introduce progressive technology.

The sides analyzed progress regarding the fulfillment of agreements on cooperation in the area of further developing a joint raw materials and production base. The solution of this task is being facilitated in the PPR, in particular, by credits from the Soviet Union and Poland's participation, together with other CEMA member countries, in the construction on USSR territory of the Yamburg-USR Western border gas pipeline, which will ensure long-term gas deliveries to the PPR.

The progress being made in fulfilling mutual trade obligations for 1986 was reviewed and was positively assessed. The Soviet side regarded with understanding the Polish side's aspiration to balance reciprocal trade in the current 5-year period. Constant growth in trade will serve to strengthen the socialist integration of the economies of the two states.

The heads of government noted with satisfaction the ongoing development of direct links between representatives of the public of the two countries, between youth and trade union organizations, between war veterans, and also between friendship societies. These links are being enriched thanks to the broadening cooperation between industrial enterprises, cultural and arts establishments, scientific research institutes and higher educational establishments. New possibilities for the development of cooperation in the above-mentioned areas are opened up as a result of the long-term agreements which have been signed.

A necessary condition for the successful implementation of the large-scale programs for the acceleration of the social and economic development of the USSR and Poland is the preservation and consolidation of peace. The unity and cohesion of the states of the socialist community, their cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA create a reliable guarantee for ensuring European and international security.

The heads of governments noted the extremely great importance of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik during which a historic opportunity was opened up for achieving progress at the talks between the USSR and the United States on the key problem of international security. However, the U.S. side turned out not to be prepared to undertake practical actions in favor of halting the arms race and to conclude the meeting with a constructive result.

The Polish side fully shares the Soviet assessment of the results of the meeting and has stated its firm support for the bold and far-reaching Soviet proposals, whose acceptance by the U.S. administration would signify a serious turn toward reaching an accord on strategic, medium-range nuclear and space armaments.

The USSR and Poland consider that the situation demands effective action and a persistent quest for peaceful solutions, for it is a matter of the secure existence of all peoples and the whole world community.

Anxiety at the continuing tense nature of the international situation, which has been brought about by the course of being adopted by the aggressive forces of imperialism toward confrontation and the buildup of the nuclear and conventional arms race, and at the threat of its spreading to outer space was expressed during the course of the talks.

The peace initiatives of the USSR, the PPR and the other socialist countries are a real alternative to this dangerous policy. The disarmament program proposed by the Soviet Union creates real opportunities for eliminating the military threat and creating a comprehensive system of international security. Poland, together with the other socialist states, firmly and consistently supports this principled course. The joint foreign policy line of the fraternal countries is expressed in the documents of the Budapest conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states.

The latest extension to the end of the current year of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions has once again demonstrated the determination of the Soviet Union to achieve progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Once again stating its support for this decision, Poland, like many other states, addresses an appeal to the United States to join the Soviet moratorium.

The USSR and PPR stressed that the strengthening of peace, security, and cooperation in Europe is one of the most important tasks of their foreign policy. The accords achieved in Stockholm as a result of the political will and desire that was displayed are an important step in the military-political sphere, creating the necessary preconditions for securing real detente and disarmament in Europe. In this connection the great importance of the forthcoming Vienna meeting of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was noted. Readiness to make a constructive contribution to the further development of all aspects of the European process was confirmed.

The sides welcomed with feelings of profound satisfaction the results of the special session of the IAEA general conference that ended recently. A new approach to the establishment of mutual understanding, trust, and openness in relations between states has triumphed in the documents adopted there.

The heads of government expressed the unanimous view that respect for the territorial and political realities that took shape in Europe as a result of World War II and of postwar development was a condition of lasting peace, mutual trust and cooperation. The existing borders on the continent are inviolable, and any attempts to cast doubt on them by revanchist forces, primarily in the FRG, are seen as an attack on the Yalta and Potsdam decisions and on the USSR and the PPR's treaties with the FRG; they are also seen as a running counter to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, and they will be most firmly resisted.

The sides noted with satisfaction the growing importance of the Nonaligned Movement, which is a great political force and plays an important part in the struggle for peace and international security and for the establishment of a new international economic order.

Having expressed deep concern over the situation that has taken shape in South Africa, the heads of government demanded an end to repression against the African majority and to acts of aggression against neighboring countries, as well as the adoption, in accordance with the UN Charter, of sanctions in relation to the Republic of South Africa. The need to implement urgently the UN resolutions on the granting of independence to Namibia was stressed.

The firm conviction was expressed that European and universal security could be reliably ensured and guaranteed through the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security, the fundamental provisions of which were set out in the joint initiative of the socialist states put forward at the 41st UN General Assembly Session. The United Nations Organization can and must play an important part in giving effect to this initiative.

The two sides expressed satisfaction with the results of the visit, which are seen as fruitful and useful, and will assist the further strengthening of fraternal friendship and the development of all-round cooperation between the USSR and the PPR.

Messner TV Interview

LD162001 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; remarks by Zbigniew Messner, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers to unidentified correspondent in Warsaw; in Polish with superimposed Russian translation; time not given -- recorded]

[Text] The opportunity that was presented by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik was not grasped by the U.S. Administration. Yet it was a question of a problem that today concerns the whole of mankind, the problem of disarmament. To judge from Comrade Gorbachev's news conference and his address on Soviet television, I think that the Soviet-American talks will, nevertheless, be continued. I repeat: great hopes for disarmament remain alive. We unanimously expressed just such an assessment of the Reykjavik meeting during conversations with Comrade Ryzhkov in Warsaw. In the course of the visit, a number of important documents were signed concerning Polish-Soviet cooperation. Particular attention is given to strengthening economic and scientific-technical ties, the organization of production on cooperative lines and the setting up of joint enterprises.

DEMICHEV-LED DELEGATION DEPARTS FOR BELGRADE

LD200842 Moscow TASS in English 0811 GMT 20 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS -- A delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet, led by Petr Demichev, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and first vice-president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, today left Moscow for Belgrade for an official visit at the invitation of Yugoslavia's Federal Assembly.

IZVESTIYA REVIEWS RYZHKOV VISIT TO POLAND

PM200853 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Special Correspondents N. Yermolovich and L. Toporkov report: "Unity of Paths and Aims"]

[Text] Warsaw -- The official friendly visit to Poland by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has ended. These days have been crammed with the most varied events which formed an extensive and worthwhile program for the visit to this fraternal country. There were meetings with representatives of the Polish working class, familiarization with advanced enterprises, official talks, conversations with party and state leaders...

At a Silesian metallurgical combine and Warsaw city hall -- indeed, wherever the prominent Soviet guest went, there was talk about our fraternity born on the battlefields of the last war and about the fact that during Poland's difficult days it could always count on the Soviet Union's understanding and support. It was necessary and natural to recall the past. But, of course, the main attention was paid not so much to the present as to the future. To questions such as how the decisions of recent party forums -- the 27th CPSU Congress and the 10th PZPR Congress, which confirmed the priority in international state affairs of cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries -- are being fulfilled. What else must be done to ensure more resolute and consistent actions in the international arena in defense of peace and against the arms race and the threat of nuclear war. Is our cooperation sufficiently successful and do we understand each other well in the attainment of the single goal of the acceleration and transfer of our countries' national economies to the path of intensive development.

The sides agreed that one cannot now be satisfied with what has been done or achieved. The success of the further development and deepening of Soviet-Polish economic, scientific, and technical relations depends on the search for innovative solutions and the closest cooperation. The talks, which culminated with the signing of a number of important documents, showed that the sides displayed complete mutual understanding in their approach to the program of further cooperation.

This would seem to represent the prime interest and importance of the Soviet government head's visit to fraternal Poland. Namely, its concrete and businesslike nature and the striving to comprehensively help deepen and expand Soviet-Polish economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. That is eloquently demonstrated by the joint documents signed 15 October. As TRYBUNA LUDU stresses in its commentary "Cooperation for the Future," N.I. Ryzhkov's arrival in Poland 8 months after the visit to the USSR by Z. Messner, chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, is least of all simply an expression of reciprocal courtesy. The main thing for the sides is the social and economic acceleration which the two states outlined in their party congress decisions. The similarity of our intentions, the newspaper writes, which cover the period to the end of the 20th century, also dictates concrete plans for close cooperation on a wider scale than ever before.

Ultimately, the success of all schemes and ventures is settled directly at enterprises, construction sites, and in labor collectives. That is where Soviet-Polish cooperation produces material results. The focus of our cooperation is now shifted to those places where material benefits are produced experience is gained. It was no coincidence, for example, that the team contract method, produced by Soviet workers, appealed to workers of Warsaw's K. Swierczewski precision instruments plant and a number of other Polish enterprises. [paragraph continues]

In its turn the collective of Moscow's "Kalibr" plant derived much of use for themselves from Polish experience of improving output quality. The first Soviet-Polish science-and-production association is now being created on the basis of the K. Swierczewski and "Kalibr" plants. This is a very important and highly promising matter.

N.I. Ryzhkov's visit and the Soviet-Polish talks in Warsaw will undoubtedly give new impetus to the energetic search for and development of progressive forms of our cooperation, including the establishment of direct production ties between enterprises and scientific establishments. It was stressed many times here recently that it is necessary to act more boldly and on a wider scale. By accelerating the processes of integration our countries are striving to increase the efficiency of their economies and, consequently, the prosperity of their peoples.

The deepening of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Poland goes beyond the framework of their bilateral national economic interests. It helps to strengthen our countries' economic security and reinforce the socialist community's position in the world arena.

The search for new paths and new approaches in the solution of the important national economic tasks facing our countries, a search manifested during the talks and enshrined in the draft documents, will undoubtedly have a most beneficial effect on invigorating the processes of socialist economic integration. It will lead to greater dynamism in implementing many spheres of the Comprehensive Program for CEMA Countries' Scientific and Technical Progress Through the Year 2000.

Our countries have every opportunity to achieve more successful and rapid socialist development. The unity of paths and aims makes cooperation between the Soviet Union and Poland particularly firm and promising. That was convincingly confirmed by the visit which is now over.

HONECKER WRITES IN PRAVDA ON GDR'S ACHIEVEMENTS

PM131050 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 86 First Edition pp 4, 6

[Article by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council: "Together with the Soviet Union -- Forward, to Great Goals"]

[Text] Thirty seven years have passed since the founding of the GDR. Looking back over the ground we have covered, full of work and struggle, on the their national holiday our people are summing up gratifying results. The first worker-peasant state on German soil has stood the test of history. Our development is distinguished by constant dynamism. Owing to the activeness of the working class and all the working people this is apparent both in the growth of our economic might and in the results we have achieved in the areas of science, education, and culture. Life is changing for the better. The GDR does everything possible to be a buttress of socialism and peace in the heart of Europe and to fulfill its internationalist duty at any time.

At this festive time one understands all the more clearly that the founding of the GDR not only had a decisive influence on the fate of our people but was also a great political event of world import. The historic chance opened up by the victory of the Soviet Union and the other anti-Hitler coalition states over fascist barbarity was taken. [paragraph continues]

We have carried out the behests of the 20 million sons and daughters of the heroic Land of the Soviets who gave their lives for that victory, and we have acted in loyalty to the memory of the antifascists and the fighters for freedom of many nations./ Fascism, imperialism and militarism have been torn out by the roots in our country. Socialism has been established forever in the GDR and war will never again begin on this German soil. In close unity with the USSR and as a firm link in the socialist community, our country is now embarking on resolving the tasks taking us up to the new millennium.

Our recent meeting with M.S. Gorbachev served as an important contribution to the task of deepening the combat cooperation of our fraternal parties and strengthening GDR-USSR through 2000 and for the longer term.

The 11th SED Congress decisions set the targets for further building a developed socialist society in the GDR. Resolving the tasks connected with this is the main aim of the various initiatives strengthening the socialist system through struggle for high results in industry and agriculture and through new achievements in science and vigorous activity in the cultural areas. People will understand that at the same time this is also the most effective contribution to the task of preserving peace. This is attested to by the widespread slogan "my work place is part of the struggle for peace."

The domestic and foreign policy worked out by the 11th SED Congress enjoys the people's full support and has an inspiring effect on the whole atmosphere in the country. In the elections to the Volkskammer, the Berlin Municipal Assembly, and the Bezirk Assemblies on 8 June this year, 99.94 percent of the 99.73-percent voting electorate voted for GDR national Front candidates. This is a convincing expression of loyalty to the cause of peace and socialism and a confirmation of the confidence among voters from all classes and strata of the population in the policy conducted by the working class party and its Central Committee. This vote of confidence by the people made the Party congress decisions a program of concrete action. Fulfilling their extensive democratic rights and responsibilities, citizens tested their candidates over the course of several months. From members of the party and state leadership to people's deputies in the Bezirke, Kreise, and Gemeindes, at enterprises and in residential districts -- they all held meetings with the country's working people and gave political talks at numerous election meetings. I had meetings with working people from the Karl Marx Stadt electoral Bezirk, where I stood as candidate, and at combines and enterprises in the cities of Erfurt, Soemmerda, and Jena. We discussed ways of resolving the tasks set by the congress.

Our party is invariably guided by the principle that socialism is being built for everyone and with the participation of everyone. We regard the widespread slogan "Take part in work, planning, and leadership" as an expression of socialist democracy. Citizens' interested participation is to be found where their aspirations and questions are reacted to quickly and with sensitivity and where working and living problems are studied seriously. Well-being and initiative are interconnected. The 11th SED Congress noted quite definitely that any worker in the state apparatus who takes an indifferent attitude to citizens' needs shows political irresponsibility. We have set the tasks of further improving the work style of party and state organs in close contact with the working masses and ensuring the increasingly broad involvement of citizens in governing the affairs of state and society. There is a firm basis for this. In all, almost one in three GDR citizens, with the right to vote fulfills some socially based function.

We proceed from the fact that real socialist democracy is valued not by quantitative indicators but by the effect of the working people's real participation in social affairs. A high level of education and qualifications gives rise to a vital need in people to be directly involved in the management of state and social matters. Consequently, a direct contribution by deputies and citizens to the drawing up and implementation of state decisions and also to the organization of control relates to criteria defining further improvement in socialist democracy. We attach great significance to informing the working people in good time on new problems of development at both state and local levels, involving them in the discussion of ways to resolve these problems at the earliest possible stage, and using their knowledge.

I will cite another fact characteristic of our socialist democracy: More than 2.5 million working people work as trade union organizers in our country's trade union organizations -- more than the number of members and candidate members of our party. Invested with extensive rights and responsibilities, they do a great deal of work. We have taken the decision to further strengthen and develop socialist democracy at the work place and at combines and enterprises by broadening trade union rights and responsibilities. New possibilities will therefore open up before them to work for the good of socialism and the cause of peace.

The comradely cooperation founded on trust that exists between the parties and mass organizations united in the GDR National Front is a great strength. Side by side with the SED, the friendly parties make their own highly valuable, specific contribution to building a developed socialist society and take part in resolving common tasks. It is particularly pleasant to note that the Free German Youth Union works energetically for the prosperity of the socialist fatherland and strives for outstanding results in its work on the republic's main construction projects. "Trust and responsibility for young people" -- this slogan is justified every day both in production and in leisure hours. So, more than 40,000 youth teams and 4,500 youth research collectives are invariably in the front ranks of the builders of socialism, struggling for high indicators in industry and agriculture. This also applies to the 13,000 young people taking part in laying a gas pipeline to the USSR. And in the creative unions life is in full swing. Literature and art provide food for thought and enrich people's sentiments by impelling them in their own way to take a creative attitude to society's interests. We regard the impassioned speeches by the republic's cultural figures in support of the 11th SED Congress decisions and in favor of socialism and peace and party policy as an important contribution to our cause.

Fulfillment of the 11th Congress decisions is in full swing, while economic and social policy is still the main area of our efforts, behind us are shock work shifts in honor of International Struggle for Peace Day. They were carried out at every enterprise and produced rich results, which must become the daily norm. The plan is being well fulfilled as a whole and is being overfulfilled in the most important indicators of production and efficiency. And all this is happening with high growth rates. The peasants are gathering a good harvest. Living conditions continue to improve. Recently, for example, new measures have begun to be taken to help young families.

Increased labor efficiency, which as is well known, is based on widespread production intensification, is more and more the result of introducing the achievements of scientific and technical progress -- especially modern, "high" technology.

The dynamism of the GDR's economic development is ensured by its well-ordered, socialist, planned economic system, which has repeatedly confirmed its efficiency. It was formed on the basis of applying general socialist laws to our country's specific conditions. Its main elements were indicated long ago, but we are constantly working on improving it. [paragraph continues]

In accordance with the principle of democratic centralism, the starting point here is central planning in close cooperation with local initiative.

The independence of large combines is constantly increasing. These economic units combine production, science, and sales. Their leaders have considerable rights and responsibilities so as to promote the reproduction process increasingly effectively. The combines' independence is based on the plan and has a secure material foundation. They have their own scientific research potential, for example, the means to produce equipment, and also construction organizations at their disposal for carrying out modernization. They manufacture automation and electronics components with their own forces.

A considerable number of combines rely on their own foreign trade organizations which conclude and implement agreements with foreign partners within the plan framework. This is to the benefit of the entire combine, because it orients certain economic units on the scale and demands of the world market and thereby has a more direct influence on their research activity, production quality, and production structure. The financial autonomy system is used consistently. To an increasing extent we are using such criteria as price, profit, credit, and interest deductions, as well as the self-financing principle, in order to direct the activities of all subdivisions in the socialist planned economy toward serving everyone's interests.

It must also be noted that the GDR's national economic organism also incorporates cooperative production, private cottage industry, private stores in the retail trade, private stores in the commission trade, and handicraft workshops. Their development is encouraged, because it contributes to improving people's conditions. Cottage industry cooperatives and private workshops are responsible for two-thirds of all services and repair work for the population.

In the final analysis, the question of this system's effectiveness can only be answered by facts. And the facts show that with the help of this system we have managed to continue the course ensuring the unity of economic and social policy and to turn in the direction of production intensification. The dynamics of our economic growth in the eighties have been high, despite the fact that the GDR is not guaranteed against changeable winds blowing from the world market. For example, the republic's national income in the period 1981-85 increased at an average of 4.5 percent per year and has continued to grow at the same rate this year. Equally interesting is an analysis of the sources of this growth. More than 90 percent of it is due to increased labor productivity, which has reached an average of 6.6 percent per year in industry taking net output as the basis.

Other trends are developing in the same direction. For the first time, in the eighties our national income is growing faster than industrial consumption, which, in turn, has steadily fallen in comparison to the total production volume in the period 1981-85. This has primarily been achieved by an average annual 5.5-percent reduction in the expenditure of energy and raw and other materials. This development is primarily true of industry. Net industrial output has increased at an annual rate of 7.4 percent and, in the past months of 1986, at a rate of 8.6 percent. At the same time prime costs have fallen by 2 percent per year. These achievements are mainly the result of science and technology becoming to an increasing extent the motive force behind increased production and production efficiency. And we are still only just beginning to comprehensively assimilate the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution.

The GDR belongs to that small number of countries which, in important areas, have the potential to develop and produce microelectronic elements, manufacture the necessary source materials for them, and produce the correspondingly high-quality technological equipment. In the period 1980-85 the production of large-scale integrated circuits increased by 630 percent and the production of electronic elements by 690 percent. In 1985 the proportion of production renewal in industry as a whole increased to 25 percent, and it will increase further to 30 percent; as far as consumer goods are concerned the figure is 30-40 percent. The measure of all this is the degree to which higher parameters and economic results are achieved with the aid of new goods on both the domestic and foreign markets.

A valuable contribution is made by socialist agriculture. We proceed from the need to make increasingly extensive use of the potential inherent in cooperative ownership of production means. During the last 5 years there has been a significant growth in harvest yields, which is based on a higher return on land per hectare. Despite unfavorable conditions in 1986 the average yield reached 46.3 quintals per hectare, and so last year's record grain harvest will be exceeded. At the same time, the production of livestock for slaughter has also increased. In addition to this, the union of horticulturists and amateur livestock breeders is contributing to the development of private initiative. This union now numbers more than 1.3 million. In 1985 the private sector accounted for 36 percent of the GDR's total production of eggs, 98 percent of its honey, 33 percent of its fruit, and 11 percent of its vegetables. We have more than 777,000 garden plots.

In accordance with the principle of unity of economic and social policy, as our economic might has increased people's working and living conditions have perceptibly improved. In the everyday life of cities and villages one can see the results of our housing construction program, on the basis of which we will have resolved the housing issue as a social problem by 1990. In the historically short space of just 20 years approximately 3.5 million apartments will have been rebuilt and modernized.

Since 1970 the net income per capita of the population has increased by 183 percent in the GDR, while real income has doubled. Retail trade turnover has increased by 177 percent

The connection between wages and work results is becoming closer. This is happening not least through the system of payment dependent on labor productivity, which we introduced in 1976 for almost 7 million workers, foremen, and working people with higher or secondary specialized education. Thanks to this, personal material interest is inducing working people to an increased extent to improve the quality and efficiency of their work, use capital economically, and observe a high level of discipline.

Despite all this, the low prices of basic food products and other goods of prime necessity have remained stable for several decades. We have low apartment and service rates. We will continue this policy because we consider it an indispensable prerequisite for maintaining an atmosphere of social stability.

At the time of preparation for the 11th SED Congress a number of ideas of the most sophisticated world standard were developed and introduced into production in the sphere of progressive modern technology, above all in the field of microelectronics. Automated production units equipped with robots made an appearance, for example. Every pilot enterprise in our combines receive at least one automated technology planning and development work station. So, when developing our economic strategy further -- through 2000 -- at the SED Congress, we had concrete experience to go on. [paragraph continues]

The pivot of this strategy is more effective combination of socialism's advantages with the scientific and technical revolution. This is being done on the basis of equipment in the GDR in close cooperation with the USSR first and foremost. The reserve necessary for this has been created by the unified socialist system of education. In 1985 some 85 percent of all working people had completed vocational education and 21 percent had higher or secondary specialized education.

Now work is being done to make progress across the entire national economic front, mainly by increasing the economic effect of using modern equipment. In this sense the cooperation between combines and GDR Academy of Sciences institutes and higher and secondary specialized academic institutions is entering a new phase. On the basis of concrete agreements the country's spiritual potential is being brought together in various spheres of the economy and mobilized to struggle for high results. More than 14,800 automated work stations for designers and technologists are now being used in the national economy, that is, double the number in use at the beginning of the year. At the end of August the production of large-scale integrated circuits had increased by 28 percent compared to the same period last year. The production of personal and office computers has increased by 129 percent and that of industrial robots by 16 percent. A total of 62,000 industrial robots are now in use in the GDR.

Modern technology and advanced scientific and technical achievements in important sectors must further increase the country's economic might in the future. This is how we interpret the main direction of further intensification in the GDR. It is mainly in this sphere that the fate of increased labor productivity will be decided. For its part, the dynamics of this process require a further improvement in production relations. In order to ensure a high standard of centralized management and planning, the process of drawing up balance sheets is to be done solely by computer -- from the state planning commission and ministries right down to each individual combine. A certain amount of experience has already been accumulated in this respect.

At the same time, we have increased both the responsibility and the potential of combines so that they can respond more quickly to the demands of markets and scientific and technical progress. This has mainly been done by improving the self-financing principle -- the formation of combine investment funds, for example, is intended to serve this aim.

The assimilation of the scientific and technical revolution's highest achievements is considerably assisted by the large extent to which the GDR and USSR national economies are interwoven. As is well known, more than 200 intergovernmental agreements and accords between our countries are at present in effect. There is no area of our economy, no combine or institute which does not have close ties with Soviet partners. The long-term program to develop our cooperation in the areas of science, technology, and production through 2000 and also the coordination of plans through 1990 provide us with a reliable basis to expand cooperation and to orient it more in the direction of strengthening the basic links in intensification -- developing key technologies and achieving advanced scientific and technical results. This also corresponds to the spirit of the Integrated Program for the Scientific and Technical Progress of the CEMA Countries through 2000.

The GDR appraises very highly the cooperation between the two countries, the level of which is reflected not least in the huge volume of reciprocal trade which, in this 5-year period, amounts to more than R82 billion. Proceeding from what has already been achieved, the GDR actively participates in further developing effective methods of cooperation in the interests of both national economies. [paragraph continues]

It is symbolic that a new ferry link between Mukran and Klaypeda was brought into operation on 2 October, several days before our republic's anniversary.

Together with the Soviet Union the GDR works to attain the great aims of socialist building, and we work shoulder to shoulder for mankind's peaceful future. Peace is the people's supreme blessing. At both the 27th CPSU Congress and the 11th SED Congress the task of preserving peace was highlighted as the most important. We fully support the proposals for nuclear disarmament and the measures in the conventional weapons sphere put forward by M.S. Gorbachev at the supreme Soviet communist forum and developed subsequently. We actively participate in implementing the extensive program approved by the Warsaw Pact states at the Budapest Political Consultative Committee conference.

Never before has the danger of nuclear catastrophe threatened peace with such force as today. But nor has there ever been such a constructive plan to preserve peace and ensure its long-term stability. But this is not the only thing. The Soviet Union is setting an example by repeatedly extending its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Through its practical action it inspires all those in the world who prefer reason and realism. In the nuclear age, war is no longer a continuation of policy by other means -- it would threaten mankind with self-annihilation. After such a war there would be no winners or losers.

The GDR continues its course of businesslike dialogue and cooperation with the aim of promoting joint action by all those who do not want the total destruction of mankind and who regard the policy of good-neighborliness as the command of the time. Peace must prevail both on earth and in space. Consequently, every step leading to this goal is valuable. This applies, for example, to the formation of a zone in Europe free of both chemical and nuclear weapons, which is the subject of proposals by the SED and the Social Democratic Party of Germany that have already been submitted or are in the process of being drawn up.

We welcome the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, which are both positive and hopeful. They could be very useful for future disarmament talks held at various levels. We consider the accord on the summit meeting between the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and the U.S. President to be held in Reykjavik within the framework of preparation for M.S. Gorbachev's U.S. visit to be particularly important.

Much blood was shed in the two world wars. A third would mean the end of the world. Everyone who thinks responsibly must do everything to ensure that present and future generation may live in peace. We are deeply committed to this aim and are totally in solidarity with our Soviet friends in this struggle.

I am glad to be able to take this opportunity to convey to the Soviet Union's Communists and all the Soviet people fraternal combat greetings, cordial congratulations, wishes for further success in their work to implement the 27th CPSU Congress decisions, and health and prosperity.

YELTSIN RECEIVES HUNGARIAN COUNTERPART

LD150352 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Today, Comrade Yeltsin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of Moscow Gorkom, received a delegation of the Budapest MSZMP City Committee, headed by Comrade Grosz, member of the MSZMP Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Budapest City Party Committee.

III. 20 Oct 86

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
EASTERN EUROPE

Ligachev Meeting

LD160642 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Ligachev today met Grosz, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and first secretary of the Budapest city party committee, who is in Moscow at the invitation of Moscow Gorkom.

During the course of a conversation, which passed in a cordial and comradely atmosphere, there was an exchange of information on the implementation of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 13th MSZMP Congress and the work of the party organizations in increasing the labor and political activity of the working people.

BULGARIAN OFFICIAL RECEIVED BY LIGACHEV, OTHERS

LD160706 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Aleksandrov, member of the Political and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, has been in the Soviet Union on a working visit from 10 to 15 October at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

Meetings were held between Comrade Aleksandrov and Comrade Ligachev, Solovyev and Razumovskiy. The meetings, which passed in an atmosphere of friendship and cordiality, were devoted to an exchange of experience in organizational and political work of the two parties, directed toward implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 13th BCP Congress.

Assurance was expressed that interaction between the fraternal parties and states on the entire complex of problems of socialist construction could continue to be strengthened in the interests of the peoples of both countries and the cause of peace and socialism.

IZVESTIYA NOTES ALBANIAN-BULGARIAN TRADE PACT

PM161157 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Text] According to the Albanian ATA News Agency, an Albanian-Bulgarian protocol on trade and payments for 1987 has been signed in Tirana.

In accordance with the document, Albania will supply electricity, ferronickel ore, bitumen, copper wire, and agricultural produce to Bulgaria. Bulgaria will export machinery and equipment, ferrous metallurgy semifinished products, steel pipes, automobile tires, and chemical industry goods to Albania.

TASS REPORTS COSMOS-1785 LAUNCHED 15 OCT

LD161023 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, October 16 TASS -- On Wednesday, artificial earth satellite "Cosmos-1785", next in the series, was launched in the Soviet Union to continue outer space exploration.

The satellite was launched into an orbit with the following parameters:

Initial period of revolution -- 11 hours 48 minutes;

Maximum distance from the earth's surface (in the apogee) -- 39,300 kilometres;

Minimum distance from the earth's surface (in the perigee) -- 608 kilometres;

Inclination of the orbit -- 62.8 degrees.

The equipment installed on board the satellite is functioning normally.

OFFICIAL OUTLINES POWER-SAVING MEASURES

LD200915 Moscow TASS in English 1927 GMT 19 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS -- "The USSR will experience a power deficit of six million kilowatts". The NEDELYA Weekly's correspondent was given this unconsoling forecast for the winter by a member of the Collegium of the Soviet Ministry of Electric Power Development and Electrification.

"The deficit has been brought about, first of all, by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, which had a marked effect on the country's energy balance", Dmitriy Protzenko said. "The accident necessitated a thorough examination of the situation at the other nuclear power stations. Maintenance work has been carried out at all of them to increase their radiation safety.

"Three new nuclear power stations, Zaporozhskaya and Rovenskaya (the Ukraine) and Kalininskaya (centre of Russia's European part), were to be put into operation in the first half of the year, but then their commissioning was put off till late this year".

"To make up for the shortage of electricity in winter, measures have been outlined to bring down power consumption in peak load hours. This will not affect production, only work schedules of enterprises will change. Power consumption will be balanced by the hours and days. For example, the beginning of the working day and the lunch break time will be shifted by one or two hours, depending on the region. Some industrial plants will start operating on weekends and have days off on weekdays", Protzenko said.

"Much attention is being given to a rational power consumption in cities. In particular, advertisement lights will be 'muffled' somewhat. By the end of 1986, with the commissioning of new power facilities with an aggregate generating capacity of nine million kilowatt, the deficit will lose its edge".

PRAVDA on Difficulties

PRAVDA HITS SHORTFALLS IN POWER GENERATION

PM141321 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Oct 86 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Preparation for Winter Is a Common Concern"]

[Excerpt] Winter is on our doorstep. At this time of year the vital activity of cities and villages and the efficient rhythm of industry and agriculture depend, above all, on the reliable working of the fuel and energy complex. As PRAVDA has already written repeatedly, the country is now being supplied with power under difficult conditions. Electricity generation at AES's and GES's is lagging behind the planned level. The situation has been complicated by the accident at Chernobyl, the failure to observe deadlines for commissioning new capacities at the Kalinin, Zaporozhye, and Rovno AES's, and the low water level in rivers.

Thermal stations are making up for the losses to some extent. Many collectives are really doing shock work. On the whole, however, power workers are making far from full use of the available potential. Suffice it to say that hundreds of millions of kilowatt-hours of electricity were not generated in the first half-year owing to accidents and equipment failures.

Such an attitude is inadmissible. It is good management, for example, not to utilize almost one-half of the capacities at the Krasnoyarsk GES? And yet roughly the same situation exists not only at enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification but also among power workers in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, the motor vehicle industry, and certain other sectors.

Increasing electricity generation is a very important concern, particularly on the threshold of winter. But it is no less important to strive to make economical use of fuel and energy. Look at the diagram published today: A 1 percent saving of fuel and energy resources on the vast scale of our country means millions of metric tons of coal and oil, billions of cubic meters of natural gas, and billions of kilowatt-hours of electricity. These are the reserves for the reliable and stable working of plants and factories, construction sites and mines, livestock-raising complexes and municipal and domestic enterprises! [passage omitted]

IZVESTIYA on Power Cuts

LD142329 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] The Moscow daily IZVESTIYA has criticized the Ministry of Energy, through the blame of which there may be an electric power deficiency in winter time. According to the newspaper, the deficiency may amount to 6.5 million kilowatts. Energy requirements have risen because of the intensification of the national economy. In the meantime, the ministry in this situation has failed to introduce reserves in time and make up for the losses of energy following the suspension of the Chernobyl nuclear power station after the accident. In this connection, IZVESTIYA urges speeding up work to make power units at the stations under construction operational and use energy-saving technology in industry more extensively.